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In evaluating the benefits of a voluntary debt-  * The opportunity cost of foreign exchange is
reduction scheme, look for efficieney gains that  low relative to world interest rates.
allow both debtor and creditor to gain.  In par-
ticular, certaii debt reduction operations can:  *  There is a great probability of default (re-
scheduling) with a deadweight loss to the
- Increase the incentives for growth in highly  creditor - and when the cost and uncertainties
indebted countries.  of reschedulings are high and bome largely by
the debtor.
* Allocate risk more efficiently between
debtor and creditors.  *  Private rather than public debt is swapped
for equity investments.
- Signal the credibility of a country's willing-
ness to "adjust" its economy to regain credit-  * The country has no other way of signaling
worthiness.  its commitment and willingness to adjust.
* Strengthen the creditors' coalition.  * The country has an extreme case of debt
overhang.
Market-based debt conversion is more likely
to improve the debtor nation's welfare when:
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An Analysis  of  Voluntary  Debt  Reductions  and  Debt
Transformations  Initiated  by Debtor  Countries
1. Introduction.
Six  years  into  the  debt  crisis,  the  prospect  for  a voluntary  return
to international  financial  markets  has  become  more  elusive  than  ever  for
a large  group  of  debtor  countries.  In  this  context,  proposals  for
general  debt  reduction  and  debt  transformation  schemes  have  been
advanced.  However,  so far  these  schemes  have  only  been implemented  in
limited  form  as commercial  banks  have  opposed  a "global",  imposed
solution  that  would  imply  forced  write-offs.  Banks  have  been  reluctant
to relinquish  any  claims  that  offer  -in  spite  of the  present  gloomy
situation-  an  upside  potential  on the  debtors  resources,  and  creditors
countries'  governments  have  opposed  the  use  of public  money  to
facilitate  such  write-offs  on the  grounds  that  this  would  in  effect  bail
out  the  banks  at the  expense  of the  taxpayer.
As a result  of the  reluctance  of the  creditors  to  write-down  their
claims  unilaterally  and  the  limited  amount  of public  support,  there  has
recently  been  an interest  in  voluntary  debt  reductions  and
transformations  (VDRT)  initiated  by the  debtor  countries  themselves  and
negotiated  on a  voluntary,  case  by case  basis  using  market  mechanisms.
It  has  been  argued  that  debtor  countries  can  improve  their  welfare
through  transactions  that  allow  them  to 'capture"  part  of the  discount
at  which  their  debts  trade  on the  secondary  market.  However,  the  case
for  VDRT  cannot  simply  be  based  on this  sort  of argument:  the  welfare
gains  for  the  debtor  cannot  be equal  to the  discount  captured  if at the
same  time,  the  discount  is  an  adequate  reflection  of expected  shortfall
in repayments.  From  a narrow  present  value  point  of  view,  VDRT
reallocate  resources  between  the  two  parties  involved  with  no overall
gains.  In  other  words,  these  schemes  are  likely  zero-net-present-value-4.
games  when  evaluated  narrowly.  Moreover,  when  the  financing  of the
operation  reduces  investment  in  valuable  economic  projects,  VDRT
represent  negative  sum  games.  However,  market  based  transactions  require
the  agreement  of not  only  just  the  participating  selling  banks  but also
of all  other  creditors,l  implying  that  debt  claims  must increase  in
value (or  at least  remain  constant).  Accordingly,  the  sum  of the  present
value  of  payments  going  to the  participating  and  remaining  creditors
will  not  be allowed  to  decline  as a result  of  VDRT.  Thus,  VDRT  which  are
at  best zero-net-present-value  games  can in  the  best circumstances  offer
no gain  to the  debtor.
As VDRT operations  have  been  initiated  at an increasing  scale  by
debtor  countries,  it  may  be that  they  are  non-negative  sum  games  with
asaociated  efficiency  gains.  Pareto  improvementz  can  arise  if  debt
reduction,  or the  contracts  which  replace  the  retired  debt  lead  to
overall  gains  which  can  then  be shared  between  the  creditors  and  the
debtor  country. 2
What  kind  of efficiency  gains  can  arise  from  debt  reduction  or  debt
transformation  and  how  will  these  be divided  among  creditors  and  debtors
given  the  modified  structure  of  external  obligations?  Our  analysis
focuses  on the  following  six  factors:  (a)  capital  might  be misused
domestically  and  thus,  debt  prepayments  might  be more  productive  than
domestic  investment;  (b)  debt  is  evaluated  differently  by the  creditors
and the  debtor  and  the  debtor  country  gains  by capturing  what it
considers  to  be a large  discount  on its  foreign  debt;  (c)  debt
reductions  can  lead  to  a reduction  of  dead-weight  losses  associated  with
a debt  overhang  and  increase  the  incentives  of the  debtor  country  to
adjust;  (d)  contract  changes  can  lead  to  more  efficient  forms  of
1 Typically  the  non-participating  creditors  must  waive  the  sharing
provisions  that  are  included  in  most  existing  loan  contracts.
Of course,  not  all  efficiency  gains  have  to go to the  either  the
debtor  or the  creditors.  Some  efficiency  gains  can  be external  to these
parties.-5-
financing,  in  particular  better  risk  sharing  between  the  debtor  and  the
creditors  and  a larger  supply  of  voluntary  finance;  (e)  if small
creditors  exit,  the  creditors  coalition  can  aim  at longer  term
solutions;  and (f)  debt  reductions  that  are  in themselves  costly  to the
debtor  can  act  as a credible  signal  of a  willingness  to "adjust"  the
economy  in a  way  that  is (more)  consistent  with the  country's  debt
obligations  which  produces  secondary  benefits.
The  paper  critically  analyzes  each  of the  above  claims  for  overall
efficienev  gains  in  a  unified  framework  that  builds  largely  on  recent
developments  in the  academic  literature  on country  debt.  As a
consequence,  we can  characterize  the  type  of  market  based  schemes  that
simultaneously  improves  the  welfare  of all  the  participants.  The  main
conclusions  are that  such  schemes  are  hard to find  in  practice.  In
particular,  debt  buybacks  are  unlikely  to  benefit  both  the  debtor  and
the  creditors  simultaneously  unless  capital  was  misused  domestically.
The  paper  goes  on to argue  that  the  scope  of Pareto-improving  VDRT  is
further  reduced  based  on (scant)  empirical  evidence  which  shows  that
only  a few  countries  have  a strong  enough  form  of debt  overhang  that
creditors  would  gain  from  collectively  reducing  debt,  which  also  implies
that  VDRT are  more likely  to  hurt  the  debtor  and  benefit  the  creditors.
The  paper  also  shows  that  the  Pareto-improving  benefits  attributed  to
debt-equity  swaps  are  only  likely  to  exist  under  a set  of fairly
restricted  conditions,  in  particular  under  the  condition  that  the  debtor
country  is  more  risk-loving  than  the  creditors.
The  outline  of the  paper  is  as follows:  section  2 analyzes  buybacks
under  a set  of neutrality  conditions  (in  particular  risk  neutrality,
symmetric  information  and  rational  expectations).  This  section  shows
that  these  schemes  are  unlikely  to improve  both  the  debtor's  and
creditors'  welfare  unless  foreign  capital  was initially  "misused"-6-
domestically.  Section  3  analyzes  the  various  efficie.cy  gains  that  could
be associated  with  debt  buybacks  and  discusses  the  conditions  under
which  buybacks  could  be a positive  sum  game  as  well  as satisfy  the
condition  that  all  the  participants  are  at least  as  well off.  Section  4
analyzes  debt  transformation  mechanisms,  in  particular  exit  bonds  and
debt-equity  swaps,  and  investigates  how these  new instruments  score  in
relation  to the  generally  desirable  characteristics  of external  claims.
Section  5 concludes.  The  appendices  include  a description  of the  most
frequently  used  voluntary  debt  reduction  and  transfcrmation  schemes  and
a discussion  of the  recent  experience,  the  proofs  of  some  propositions
and  some  worked  out  examples.
2.  A Simple  Analysis  Of Debt  Buybacks
Let  us assume  that  a coun.try's  foreign  debt  is trading  at  a
discount.  What are  the  effects  of a  buy-back  on the  debtor's  and  on its
creditors'  welfare?  We start  the  analysis  in  a simple  and  quite  neutral
framework.  These  assumptions  are  then  dropped  in subsequent  discussions.
(Al)  Both  the  debtor  country  and its  creditors  are  risk  neutral;
(A2)  Both  the  debtor  country  and its  creditors  have  similar  rates  of
time  preference;
(A3)  Creditors  are  homogeneous  and  similar  in  all  respects,  and  the
secondary  debt  market  is  competitive  and  efficient,  i.e.,  reflects
correctly  the  anticipated  stream  of  payments  received  by creditors;
(A4)  All  that  is  paid  by the  debtor  accrues  to its  creditors;  and
(A5)  The  debtor  and its  creditors  have  the  same  information  set.
Debt  buybacks  are  effectively  prepayments  of liabilities  as they
involve  the  use  of current  resources  in  order  to lower  future
obligations.  Given  the  neutrality  assumptions  (Al)  to (A5),  the
operation  can  affect  the  debtor  and  the  creditors  through  two  channels:-7-
(i)  & Risk  Shifting  Effect:  the  reduction  in future  obligations  makes
the  remaining  debt  less  risky;
(ii)  A Creditworthiness  Effect:  the  expenditure  of current  resources  can
reduce  investment  and  the  future  ability  of the  debtor  to  pay,
increasing  risk  on the  remaining  debt.
In general,  the  resources  used in the  buyback  will  be divided
between  reductions .:  consumption  and  investment  in  an optimal  fashion. 3
To focus  on the  risi  effect,  we start  the  anelysis  by first  considering
that only consumption  will be reduced. This allows us  to analyze the
benefits  of a reduction  in future  obligations  per  se,  not  a simple
matter  once  the  riskiness  present  in  external  debt  claims  is  recognized.
In the  second  section,  we analyze  the  creditworthiness  effect  by
considering  the  case  whiere  all  the  funds  used in  the  buyback  come  from  a
reduction  in investment  and  where  the  resources  available  in  the  future
are  thus  reduced.
2.1  The  Risk  Shifting  Effect
With investment  fixed,  it is  best to  think  of the  relation  between
the  two  parties  as  a zero  sum  game:  the  debtor's  current  and  (uncertain)
future  resources  have  to  be divided  between  itself  and  its  creditors.
The  buyback  only  affects  the  division  of output  in  all  periods.  The  key
point  is that  as the  buyback  reduces  the  riskiness  of the  remaining
claims,  it shifts  the  sharing  of future  output  to the  detriment  of the
debtor. 4 To see  that,  it is important  to recognize  that  in the  case  of
heavily  indebted  countries,  international  debt  contracts  represent  risky
3 Foreign  exchange  reserves  are  treated  here as  a form  of investment.
4This  is  the  reverse  of  a classical  argument  in  corporate  finance
according  to  which  a  new issue  of  risky  debt  transfers  wealth  from  the
old  bondholders  to  the  shareholders.  The  issuance  of "junk  bonds"  to
finance  takeovers  leads  to  substantial  reductions  in  the  price  of old
bonds,  while  at the  same  time  shareprices  rise.  Moreover,  corporations
seldom  buy  back  their  own  bonds  unless  they  are  required  to  do so  by the
bond  covenants.  In the  case  of international  debts,  this  argument  is
forcefully  made in  Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1988b).claims  that  might  not  get  fully  repaid  in some  circumstances.  The  actual
repayment  may  deviate  from  the  contractual  repayment  when the  debtor  can
bargain  for  a smaller  repayment,  a situation  that  arises  when  output  is
relatively  low,  making  the  threat  of default  more  credible. 5 The
repayment  in the  states  of  nature  where  bargaining  occurs  will  be
independent  of the  size  of the  contractual  obligation.  As a marginal
debt  buyback  will  reduce  the  contractual  future  debt  repayment  in  all
future  states  of  nature  by the  face  amount  of  debt  bought  back  and
therefore  the  effective  repayment  only  in the  good  states,  it  will  only
lead  to  a  marginal  reduction  of the  effective  repayment  in the  good
states  of nature.
For  a  highly  indebted  country,  it  is likely  that  the  probability  of
a full  repayment,  i.e.,  of good  steaes  of  nature,  is small.  Accordingly,
the  expected  savings  implied  by a  marginal  reduction  of the  contractual
size  of debt  can  be quite  small.  However,  the  price  at  which  debt  can  be
reduced  through  a  buyback  will  reflect  the  creditors'  valuation  of the
averag, across  both good  and  bad states  of  nature,  rather  than  the
m.arginal  reduction  in  expected  debt  service.  As a result,  the  debtor
ends  up overpaying  for  a marginal  reduction  in its  future  debt  burden.
To see  more  precisely  the  influence  of this  risk  shifting  effect  on
the  payoffs  of the  debtor  and  the  creditors,  we consider  the  simplest
intertemporal  model  of  a debtor  country.  Thera  will  be two  periods,
today  (t-l),  and  the  future  (t-2).  The  debtor  has  an  outstanding
external  debt  obligation  of D  which  falls  due  in  the  future.  The  risky
nature  of external  debt  is  reflected  by the  fact  that  it is  common
s  Output  is to  be interpreted  here  as the  amount  of resourcas  available
for  external  debt  service.  The  threat  of default  is  more  credible  when
the  opportunity  costs  of servicing  the  debt  is  relatively  high,  which  is
more likely  to occur  when  output  is  low.  This  type  of  result  has  been
derived  in  bargaining  models  of international  debt  either  by using  a
Nash  solution  or the  extensive  form  of a game.  In particular,  see  Bulow
and  Rogoff  (1988a)  and  Fernandez  and  Rosenthal  (1988)  for  further
details.-9-
knowledge  that  the  debtor  country  will only  repay  all  its  obligations
in the  future  when the  contractual  repayment  D is  below  a certain
fraction  (a)  of its  future,  random  output,  Y+f(I).  Future  output  is
uncertain  as the  endowment  Y is  a random  variable  which  can  described  by
a distribution  function  G(.)  and  a density  function  g(.),  with a support
of [Y,Y].  f(I)  represents  the  gross  return  on the  investment  I  which  is
undertaken  in the  first  period,  with  f'>O  and  f"'<O.  To summarize,  the
future  debt  repayment,  denoted  by R, will  be the  smallest  of D and
a(Y+f(I)),  i.e.,  R  - mintD,a(f(I)+Y].  The  secondary  market  price  for
debt,  p, is taken  to  be determined  by creditors  consistent  with this
repayment  behavior.6
If the  debtor  uses  an  amount  X of  current  resources  for  a debt
buyback  at a  price  p (per  unit  of future  obligations),  a reduction  in
current  consumption  of  X will  allow  for  a reduction  of (X/p)  of future
contractual  debt  obligations.
7 The  actual  future  debt  lepayment  k  will
now  be given  by:
(1) R(X,p)  - Min [(D-X/p),  a(Y+f(I))]
To  close  the  model,  assume  that  the  debtor's  welfare  is given  by a
simple  intertemporal  expected  utility  function  E(W)-C 1 +bE(C 2), where  Ci
represents  consumption  in  period  i,  i-(1,2),  b is  the  country's  discount
factor  and  E is the  expectation  operator.  The  debtor  budget  constraints
are  given  by;
(2)  C 1 - E1-X-I  where  E1 is  the  endowment  in  period  t-l
(2')  C 2 - Y+f(I)-R
6 This  assumes  rational  expectations  and  homogenous  creditors.
7We  ignore  the  change  in  the  price  of debt  as  a result  of the
(announcement  of the)  debt  buyback.  For  small  debt  buybacks  this
assumption  is  justified.  See  further  section  2.3.-13-
For  every  level  of the  variables  D, X, and  I there  will  be a cut-
off income  level  Y* below  wihich  the  remaining  debt  obligation  [D  (X/p)]
will  not  be fully  serviced  and the  debtor  partially  defaults.  Y* solves:
(3)  a(Y*+f(I)) - D - (X/p))
The  probability  of this  siappening  is  G(Y*)  (or  short  G*).  We can
then  write  the  expected  value  of the  debt  service  as a function  of  X and
p as follows:
Y* (4)  E[R(X,p)]  f  a[Y+f(I)]g(Y)dY  +  (1-G*)[D-X/p]
y
We can  also  write  the  "price"  of a  unit  of debt  as the  present  value  of
the  expected  repayment  divided  by the  amount  of  outstanding  debt:
(4') p  - E[R(X,p)]  / [r(D-X/p)]
where  r is the  world  interest  rate.  Assuming  for  simplicity  that
r-(l/b)=l,  we can  show  that:
Proposition  1.  A marginal  buyback  funded  by a reduction  in  consumption
is  a zero  sum  game.  The  transaction  reduces  the  welfare  of the  debtor  by
[1-(l-G*)/p]  and  increases  the  wealth  of the  remaining  creditors  by the
same  amount  through  an increase  in  the  price  of the  remaining  debt.
For  a $1 reduction  in consumption,  the  debtor  can  retire  $1/p  units
of contractual  debt  obligation.  However,  this  reduces  the  expected
repayment  only  by '.  '.-G*)/p,  where  (1-G*)  is  the  probability  of full
debt  service.  It turns  out  that  the  reduction  in the  expected  repayment
will  necessarily  be less  than  the  $1  used in  the  buyback.-11-
Mathematically, this is  simple  to  verify.8  Using  (3)  and (4)  we can
prove  that  (l-G*)/p  < 1:
Y*
p - (f  ra(Y+f(I))]g(Y)dY  +  [D-X/p](l-G*)  )  /  (D-X/p)
y
Y*
f  (  a(Y+f(I))]g(Y)dY  /  (D-X/p]  }  +  (1-G*)  >  (1-G*)
y
Intuitively,  the  expected  reduction  in  repayment,  (l-G*)/p,  is
necesscrily  smaller  than  the  initial  expense  of 1 because  debt  is
retired  at its  average  price  which  is  always  larger  than  the  marginal
reduction  in future  repayment.  In fact,  these  two  values  are  equal  only
if the  debt  is  not  risky  and  the  price  of a  unit  of debt  is  one (i.e.,
G* - 0).
The  remaining  creditors  gains  are  reflected  by an increase  in the
price  of debt  after  the  buyback  as the  remaining  debt  becomes  more
likely  to  oe repaid.  Differentiating  (4)  and  solving  using  (3),  we have:
(5)  dp/dXix,o  - (l/D)[l-dE[R]/dp]
- (l/D)[l-(l-G*)/p]  >0
Thus,  the  payoff  of the  remaining  debtholders  pD increases  by
[(D-X/p)(dp/dX)]  which,  evaluated  at X-0,  is  equal  to [l-(l-G*)/p].
Their  gain  for  a $1  of  buyback  is  thus  $1 less  the  discounted  value  of
the  expected  reduction  of future  payments  which  is  given  by (1-G*)  -- the
probability  of full  repayment,  times  the  quantity  of debt  retired  (l/p).
8  For  more  rigorous  mathematical  proofs  we refer  to  Appendix  2.-12-
To illustrate,  we use  an  example  where  the  outstanding  debt  stock  is
normalized  to D-1.  We initially  set:  r-b-l;  a - 0.05;  the  gross  return
on investment  in the  future  period  is given  by f(I)-l0,  the  marginal
return  on investment  is  f'-l;  the  endowment  component  Y is  normally
distributed  around  0 with  a standard  deviation  of a,  with  o-5 9. The
critical  level  of  Y for  which  the  country  will  prefer  to  bargain  over
the  repayment  is given  by equation  (3),  which  for  the  chosen  parameters
implies  Y*-10,  two  standard  deviations  from  the  mean  of  Y.  The  states
in  which  the  country  defaults,  Y<Y*-10,  will then  occur  with  a
probability  of G*-0.95.  Using  (4'),  oue  gets  a price  of $0.52.  A
marginal  buyback  of $X reduces  the  debt  repayment  in  the  good  states  by
$X/p  - l.91X  and  in the  bad  states  by zero.  This  implies  an expected
saving  for  the  country  of $.05*X/p  - O.1X,  a  much  smaller  quantity  than
$X,  the  amount  initially  spent.  The  debtor  expected  net  loss  is thus
$(X-O.lX)  - $0.9X.  The  participating  creditors  collect  $X  and  are
equally  well  off,  as  we assumed  that  the  debt  buyback  was  done  at the
pre-buyback  price.  The remaining  debtholders  gain  as their  expected
payoff  increases  by $[l-(l-G*)/p]*X  - 0.9X.  Note that  the  gains  for  the
remaining  creditors  is due  to  the  fact  that  the  buyback  is funded  by
resources  coming  out  of consumption,  implying  that  new  resources  have
now  become  available  to them.
Figure  1 depicts  the  effect  of different  levels  of (a)  on the  debt
price,  p(a),  and  the  marginal  gain  for  the  creditors,  g(a).  As (a)  gets
larger,  the  probability  of default  decreases  and  in  addition,  the
creditors  can  collect  a  higher  fraction  of the  country's  wealth  in cases
of default.  As a result  the  secondary  price  is increasing  in  a. The  gain
of  buybacks  to the  creditors  g(.)  decreases  in (a)  as [(l-G*)/p]  goes  to
one.  In fact,  the  higher  the  secondary  market  price,  the  smaller  is  the
wealth  transfer.  In the  example  used,  the  marginal  benefits  for  the
creditors  approach  zero  and  the  secondary  market  price  approaches  1  when
(a)  significantly  exceeds  0.3.
The  effect  of a  mean-preserving  increase  in the  uncertainty  about
the  country's  future  endowment  is simulated  in figure  2  whiich  depicts
the  effects  of a  change  in  a on the  debt  price  p(a)  and  the  creditors'
10  marginal  gain  g(a).  The  effect  of an increase  in standard  deviation  on
the  secondary  mart-et  price  turns  out,  in  the  case  of a  normal
distribution,  to  be ambiguous  a-priori  and  the  secondary  price  can
decline  as  well  as increase. 11 In  the  example  used,  the  pribability  of
9  The  choice  of  values  is  intendei  to  capture  magnitudes  that  are
consistent  with the  situation  of an  average  highly  indebted  country.
Since  f(I)  represents  the  present  value  of future  wealth,  expected  per
period  income  is 1  with a  discount  rate  of 10%  and  no expected  growth.  D
represents  the  stock  of  outstanding  debt.  Thus,  the  debt  to  GNP is  100%.
The  value  of 0.05  for (a)  implies  that  the  creditors  can  extract  5%  of
GDP (or  of tradeable  resources)  per  year.  The introduction  of
uncertainty  thrcugh  the  country's  endowment  should  be seen  as a
mathematical  convenience:  it  also  reflects  the  uncertainty  regarding  the
creditors  leverage  over  the  debtor  in terms  of resource  extraction.
10  The assumptions for the parameters are a - 0.05, f(I) - 10, D - 1,  b
1 /r - 1.
An increase  in  standard  deviation  will  put  more  weight  in  the  tails
of the  distribution  and  less  in  the  center.  Depending  how  much "tail"
and  how  much "center"  is included  in the  distribution  below  the  critical-13-
defallt  decreases  in  a, implying  an increase  in price  and  an associated
reduction  in the  marginal  wealth  transfer  to  the  creditors.
FIGURE 1
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FIGURE 2
Effect  of  v  on  the  debt  price  and  on  the  creditors






level  of  Y, the  probability  of  default  can  go  up or down.-14-
2.2  The  Creditworthiness  Effect
It is  unlikely  that  buybacks  will  be financed  solely  by a reduction
in  current  consumption.  In general,  they  would  be accommodated  by an
optimal  combination  of consumption  and  investment  cuts.  If  a reduction
in investment  is  used  to finance  buybacks,  the  debtor's  output  is
expected  to  decrease  in  the  future,  reducing  its  "creditworthiness".  The
remaining  creditors  will  then  implicitly  pay  part  of the  buyback  costs
as expected  future  resources  decline.  For  example,  if  international
reserves  are  depleted  in the  operation,  expected  future  repayments  can
decrease.  This  creditworthiness  effect  counteracts  the  risk  shifting
effect  and  makes  buybacks  less  attractive  to the  creditors  and  more
attractive  to the  debtor.
In order  to  appreciate  the  importance  of the  source  of funds  used
in  the  buyback  operation,  consider  that  the  debt  buyback  is  completely
financed  by an equal  reduction  in investment.  In terms  of our  model,
this  fixes  C1 and  implies  that  I  decrease  by an amount  X. We can  show
that:
Proposition  2:  A marginal  buyback  financed  by a reduction  in investment
affects  the  payoffs  of the  debtor  and  the  remaining  creditors  by:
(6) dE[W]/dX  - (1-G*)/p-f'(l-aG*)
(7) Ddp/dXlxo  l1-(l-G*)/p-af'G*
A $1 of  buyback  reduces  the  contractual  obligation  by $(l/p)  and
increases  the  debtor's  future  consumption  by that  amount  in the  good
states.  The  resulting  expected  gain  in future  consumption  is $(l-G*)/p.
At the  same  time,  investment  goes  down  by $1  which  reduces  expected
future  output  in  all  states  by f',  the  marginal  return  on capital.  The
reduced  output  in  turn  leads  to a reduction  in  expected  repayments  of
(af')  in the  bad  states,  implying  an  expected  debt  relief  of  G*af'.  The
remaining  creditors  gain  $1  minus  the  expected  reduction  in future
repayments  in the  good  states  $[(l-G*)/p]  and  in the  default  states-15-
$[af  'G*].1
The  size  of both (a)  and (f')  are  thus  crucial  in  determining  the
overall  effect  of  a buyback  on the  debtor's  welfare.1 3 The  debtor  stands
to  gain  and  the  remaining  creditors  to lose  when:  (i)  (a)  is  large
because  in  that  case,  a large  part  of the  costs  of the  buyback  would  be
financed  by the  creditors  through  smaller  repayments  in the  bad states;
and (ii)  f' is  small  because  the  smaller  is f' the  less  costly  is the
reduction  of investment  for  the  debtor.
But,  beyond  the  accounting  of gains  or losses  for  each  side  of the
debt  contract,  what  is  ultimately  more important  for  debt  reduction
operations  is  whether  they  generate  efficiency  gains.  In  our  model,
efficiency  gains  can  be only  secured  when funds  are  Dut to a  better  use,
that  is  when f' is  smaller  than  1, the  world's  interest  rate.  Unless
this  holds,  it is  easy  to show  that  one  side  of the  debt  contract  has to
lose  if  the  other  side  gains.l4  To see  why  this  is  so,  we can  compute
the  overall  value  of the  same  by adding  (5)  and (6).  We get:
(8)  [Ddp/dX]+[dE(W)/dX]-  1-f'
The  debt  buyback  operation  is thus  a  positive  sum  game  only  if
f'<l,  i.e  if  capital  was  used  inefficiently  in  the  debtor  country
initially.  The  efficiency  gains  of reduced  investment  can  then  be shared
between  creditors  and  debtor.  Otherwise,  debt  prepayments  are  a negative
sum  game  and  the  economic  pie  gets  smaller  when  loans  are  prepaid  at the
cost  of  reducing  investment  in  ventures  with  a  higher  return  than  the
world  interest  rate.
12  The  expression  for  the  price  effect  can  be derived  as for  proposition
1  by differentiating  (1)  and  using  (4),  and  taking  into  account  that  the
buyback  is  done  at the  original  price.  See  further  Appendix  2.
13  Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1988b)  and  Krugman  (1988)  present  models  that  are
more  restrictive.  The first  paper  implicitly  assumes  that  f'-1  while  the
second  takes  a-i  and  f'-l.
14  It is  also  possible  that  both lose.-16-
To illustrate  consider  the  example  of the  previous  section.  Equation
(6)  implies  that  the  country's  welfare  is  unaffected  iff (l-G*)/Ip(l-
aG*)l  - f'.  Equation  (7)  implies  that  the  creditors'  payoff  is
unaffected  iff (1  - (l-G*)/p]/[aG*]  - f'.  Finally,  equation  (8)  implies
that  the  total  economic  pie  increases  iff  f'<l.  These  equations,  given
certain  values  for  a, f(I)  and  D, represent  implicitly  combinations  of a
and  f' that  leave  respectively  the  debtor  and  the  creditor  indifferent
to  the  buyback  operation.  UJsing  similar  values  for  the  parameters  as in
the  first  example,  the  curves  that  leave  the  creditors  and the  debtor
respectively  indifferent  are  drawn  in figure  3 in the (a,  f')  space.
FIGURE  3
Effect  of  f'  and  a  on  the  Payoffs
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The  debtor's  indifference  curve  starts  at the  origin  and  flattens
out  quite  rapidly.  The creditors'  indifference  curve  looks  like  a
hyperbole,  starting  at  high level  of f'  for  low  levels  of (a)  and
approaching  f'-0  for  a-i. The intersection  of the  two  indifference
curves  is  at f'-l  and  a-0.396.  The  two  indifference  curves  divide  the
(a,f')  space  into  four  sections.  When f'>l,  at least  one  side,  and
possibly  both sides  lose,  as  we  have shown  in  equation  (8).  On the  other
hand,  at least  one  side,  and  possibly  both gain,  when f'<l.  More
precisely,  in sections  III  and  IV the  debtor  stands  to gain  as (a)  is
relatively  large  and  f' is  low  and  in  sections  II  and  III  the  creditors
lose  as f'  and (a)  are  relatively  high.  The  creditors  tend  to gain  when
both f' and  (a)  are  low,  which  happens  in  sections  I  and  IV.  Only  in
section  IV  will  buybacks  be Pareto-improving.
…
15  Specifically,  o - 5,  D - l, and  f(I)  is  assumed  to  be 10.-17-
Some  interesting  special  cases
(i) Assume  first,  as in  the  corporate  bankruptcy  case  and  in the  case
considered  by Krugman  (1988),  that  f'-1  and  a-i (this  situation  is
represented  in figure  3 by point  A in  section  II).  Buybacks  will then
increase  the  debtor's  welfare  and  reduce  the  creditors'  payoffs. 1 6 A $1
used for  buybacks  reduces  debt  repayment  in the  good  states  by $(1/p)
dollars  and  by  $1 in the  bad states.  The  debtor  comes  out  ahead  because
it  manages  to use  its  reserves  to reduce  its  repayment  in the  good
states  without  affecting  its  repayment  in the  bad  states.  With  a-l,  the
country's  foreign  exchange  resources,  if  not  consumed,  were  always
available  to  the  creditors  for  future  debt  service. However,  the
country  can  use  these  reserves  in the  current  period  to reduce  future
debt  by more  than  one  unit  and  gain  from  it.  The  creditors  subsequently
lose.
(ii)  In the  other  extreme  case,  when  a-0  and  f'-l,  considered  by Bulow
and  Rogoff  (1988b),  these  results  are  reversed  (point  B in section  I in
figure  3)."  In this  case,  the  debtor  bears  fully  the  output  reduction
in  all  states  and  thus  finances  fully  the  debt  buyback.  The  risk
shifting  effect  then  dominates,  and  the  debtor  loses  while  the  creditors
gain  at its  expense. The  resources  used  for  the  buyback  could  never
have  been  extracted  by the  creditors,  so effectively  prepaying  debt  is  a
loss  to the  debtor.
The  amount  of resources  transferred  by debtor  countries  to (private)
creditors  in  any  given  y_ar  has  been  at  most  10%  of  GNP  and  at  most 25%
of exports.  The  1988-1989  edition  of the  World  Debt  Tables  indicates
16  It  can  be checked  that  in that  case,  dE(W)/dX-(l-G*)(l/p-l)>O  and
Ddp/dX-1-[G*+(l-G*)/p]<0-
17  In  terms  of the  formulae  in  proposition  2,  we have  dE(W)/dX-[-l+(l-
G*)/p]<O  and  Ddp/dX-l1l/r[(l-G*)/p]>O.  For  (a)  exactly  zero  the  price  of
debt  is  zero  as the  country  can  always  default  without  any  penalty.  The
result  of the  limiting  case  a  - 0 implies  that  (l-G*)/p  goes  to  zero  and
that  dE[W]/dX--l  and  Ddp/dX-1.-18-
that  the  highest  ratio  of  debt  service  to  GNP  over  the  years  1980-1987
for  the  group  of all  developing  countries  as a  whole  was  4.5% in  1987
and  5% for  the  highly  indebted  countries.  The  highest  debt  service  to
export  ratio  for  all  countries  was 20.2%  in  1986;  for  highly  indebted
countries  it  was 29%  in  1986.18  Taking  a debt  service  to  resource  ratio
of 10%  and  using a-  10%  yields  in  our  example  positive  sum  outcomes
only  when f'<  0.2  i.e  for  Large  negative  returns  on investment  of the
order  of -80  percent.  This  might  be indicative  of  how "misused"  foreign
capital  must  be in order  for  buybacks  to  be able  to generate  efficiency
gains.
Buybacks  financed  by cutting  investments  are  thus  unlikely  to lead
to  beneficial  welfare  effects  for  the  debtor  given  the  considerations
discussed  so far.  Thus,  considering  the  recent  popularity  of voluntary
debt reduction  and  transformation  schemes,  and if  we want to  take
revealed  preferences  seriously,  there  must  exist  other  ways through
which  buybacks  remove  some  inefficiencies.  A number  of these  other  ways
will  be discussed  in  section  4.
2.3  Large  Swap  and  Price  Effect
So far,  our  discussion  has  been  for  small  swaps,  which  implied  that
the  price  at which  the  debtor  could  buy  back its  debt  could  reasonably
be assumed  not co  be affected.  For  large  swaps  this  would  not  be
realistic.  The  country  will  only  be able  to  buy  up its  debt  at the  ex-
post  price,  which  will  be  higher  than  the  current  price  assuming
competitive  creditors.  This  is  because  a rational  market  will foresee
that  a reduction  in  foreign  debt  increases  the  expected  future  repayment
18  The  World  Economic  Outlook,  which  uses  a  broad  definition  of debt
service  payments  including  interest  on short-term  debt,  indicates  in its
October  1988  edition  that  the  highest  ratio  of debt  service  payments  to
exports  for  countries  with  debt  servicing  problems  was 39.5%  in  1982  and
that  the  corresponding  debt  service  to  GDP  ratio  was  7%.  The  figures  for
net transfers  are  even  smaller.-19-
per  unit of remaining  debt  and  will  therefore  only  sell  at the  higher
ex-post  price.  This  price  effect  makes  buybacks  more  costly  and  less
desirable  for  the  debtor.  The  extra  gains  for the  creditors  will  now  be
equally  split  between  the  participating  and  remaining  creditors. 19
Figure  4 demonstrates  this  price  effect  most  clearly,  as it  plots
the  secondary  market  price  p(X)  as a function  of the  relative  amount  of
debt  bought  back for  the  case  where  the  buyback  is  funded  by a  cut in
consumption. 20 The  variable  X should  be interpreted  as the  amount  of
resources  used for  the  buyback  relative  to the  stock  of debt
outstanding.  As one  can  see  from  figure  4, the  secondary  market  price
rises  significantly  with  the  relative  size  of the  buyback,  further
increasing  the  loss  to  the  debtor  and  the  gains  to the  creditors.
FIGURE 4
Price Effect of Large Buybacks
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19  Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1988b)  argue  that  the  buyback  by Bolivia  has
harmed  the  country  as the  increase  in the  secondary  market  price  after
the  buyback  was so  large  that  the  market  value  of debt  (the  expected
value  of repayments  by Bolivia)  increased,  leaving  Bolivia  worse  off, in
spite  of the  fact  that  the  funds  used for  the  buyback  were  donated  to
Bolivia.  See  further  Helpman  (1987),  Dooley  (1988)  and  Rodriguez  (1988)
for  the  effect  of large  buybacks  and  the  division  of  gains  and  losses.
20  The  parameters  are  a  - 0.05,  f(I)  - 10,  a - 5,  f(I)  - 10,  b-l/r-l,
and  D  - 1.-20-
3.  Positive  Sum  Games
As we have  shown  above  that  debt  buybacks  are  unlikely  to occur  in
the  absence  of efficiency  gains  (abstracting  from  situations  where
capital  was  misused  initially)  we are  led  to  analyze  various  potential
reasons  for  efficiency  gains:  (i)  the  debt  contract  may  be valued
differently  by the  two  sides;  (ii)  with less  debt  outstanding,  the
debtor  may  be more inclined  to  expend  more  effort  (on  producing  future
resources)  because  relatively  more  of the  future  benefits  of its
"efforts"  can  be kept;  (iii)  a costly  buyback  (from  the  debtor's
perspective)  can  signal  that  the  debtor  is  relatively  credit-worthy  and
willing  to increase  its  investment  effort;  (iv)  buybacks  can  reduce
creditors'  coalition  problems  as certain  "problem"  creditors  exit;  and
(v)  there  might  exist  differences  in  valuation  among  creditors  so that
what  was in the  previous  analysis  a loser  can  be reinterpreted  as a
pessimistic  gainer.
3.1  Differences  In  Valuation
Let  us drop  assumptions  (A2)  and (A4)  of section  2  and  explore  the
possibility  that  each  side  of the  debt  contract  values  the  cash  stream
arising  from  the  debt  obligation  differently.  We use the  basic  case  of
the  previous  section,  with the  assumption  that  the  funds  for  the  buy-
back  are  made  available  through  a reduction  in  consumption.
In  a rational  and  efficient  market,  the  price  of an  asset  is given
by the  sum  of the  discounted  expected  repayments  received  by the  asset
holders.  Similarly,  the  value  of a liability  to the  debtor  country  is
given  by the  sum  of the  discounted  expected  payments  made.  Differences
in  valuation  can  only  arise  when:  (i)  future  cash  flows  are  evaluated
differently,  i.e.,  discount  factors  are  not  equal;  (ii)  the  amounts  paid
by the  debtor  are  different  from  those  received  by the  creditors;  and
(iii)  probabilistic  assessments  differ.  In this  latter  case,  it is-21-
natural  to  believe  that  the  debtor  possesses  superior  information  about
relevant  variables.  However,  unless  the  buybacks  were  kept secret,  the
operation  would  reveal  favorable  information  and  drive  prices  up.  We
leave  the  discussion  of this  factor  to  section  3.4  and  analyze  here (i)
and (ii).
Let  us denote  by (c)  the  proportion  of output  received  by the
creditors  in  the  bad states  of  nature  which  may  be different  from  (a),
the  share  of output  paid  by the  debtor.  The  presumption  is  that (a)  is
larger  than (c).  One  reason  for  this  wedge  is  that  the  penalties  that
are  imposed  by the  creditors  in  case  of a partial  default  do  not
necessarily  accrue  to them  as net  benefits.  For  example,  penalties  as
trade  embargo  do not  benefit  the  creditors  (c-O),  but imposes  costs  on
the  debtor  (O<a<l); 2 1. Moreover,  negotiations  and  constant  rescheduling
exercises  are  costly  partly  because  of temptations  for  posturing  in
order  to extract  concessions2223  and  the  uncertainty  surrounding  debt
negotiations  generates  dead-weight  losses  in  the  debtor  country  as the
private  sector  becomes  less  inclined  to invest  domestically,  and  more
inclined  to save  abroad.  Finally,  regulatory  and  tax  regulations  in the
creditors  countries  can  also  generate  valuation  wedges:  for  non-
performing  loans,  an important  cost  to the  lender  will  be the  tying  up
of reserves  due  to  regulatory  -uidelines.  Moreover,  selling  loans  at a
discount  allows  the  bank to take  tax  losses  making  the  repayment
21 The  notion  that  the  payments  made  by the  debtor  can  be significantly
smaller  than  the  payments  received  by the  creditors  has  been  disputed  by
Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1988a)  that  stress  the  ex-post  irrationality  of such  a
Pareto  dominated  settlement;  instead  of punishing  defa-ulting  countries,
debtor  and  creditors  are  better  off (ex-post)  agreeing  on  a partial
default  that  divides  the  costs  of the  penalty  among  themselves.
22 Rotemberg  (1988)  develops  a  more  formal  model  in  which  debt
repurchases  are  advantageous  for  all  parties  because  of a reduction  in
bargaining  coats.  In  his  model,  the  bargaining  costs  are  large  when
sovereign  debts  are  large  and  the  costs  are  borne  by the  creditors.  As a
result  reductions  in  debt  can  lower  bargaining  costs  and  improve  both
p3arties'  welfare.  See  also  Morande  and  Schmidt-Hebbel  (1988).
For  example,  the  cost  of the  Brazilian  moratorium  of 1987  has  been
estimated  to  about  $12  billion.  This  includes  the  cost  of reduced  trade
lines  and  of lost  interest  on official  reserves.-22-
received  large.r  than  the  repayment  made.
2 4 Thus,  a strong  case  can  be
made for (a)  being  larger  than  (c):  not  all  costs  and  payments  borne  by
the  debtor  in  case  of a default  or  bargaining  situation  accrue  to the
creditors.  25
Let  us also  allow  the  creditors  discount  factor,  1/r,  to  be
different  from  the  debtor's  discount  factor,  b. In a  manner  similar  to
(but  more  general  than)  proposition  1,  we can  show  that 26:
Proposition  3.  A marginal  buy-back  funded  by a reduction  in  consumption
is  a game  with a total  marginal  payoff  of
(9)  [(l-G*)/p][b-(l/r)l  + [g*D/(apr)](l-c/a)
The  transaction  affects  the  welfare  of the  debtor  marginally  by
(10)  dW/dX-  -l+b(l-G*)/p
and  the  wealth  of the  remaining  creditors  marginally  by
(11)  Ddp/dX-  l-[(l-G*)/pr]+[g*D/(apr)](l-c/a)
The  total  payoff  generated  by the  transaction  is  comprised  of two
elements,  one  due to  discount  rate  differences  and  the  other  due  to
differences  between  payments  made  and  received  in the  bad states.
Indeed,  if  b-1/r  and  a-c,  the  payoffs  in  equation  (9),  (10)  and (11)
reduce  to the  payoffs  given  in  Proposivion  1. In  particular,  the  sum  of
the  game in (9)  becomes  zero.
The  first  effect,  the  discount  rate  effect,  is  positive  when  b>l/r,
i.e.,  when  the  debtor  is  less  impatient  than  the  creditors.  In that
case,  a Pareto  improving  transaction  is for  the  debtor  to  lend,  or
similarly,  to prepay  debt.  When  a>c,  the  second  effect  is  positive  and
24  However,  a sale  of a loan  in the  secondary  market  can  oblige  the
seller  to  take  an accounting  loss  and  may  contaminate  the  rest  of the
loan  portfolio,  obliging  the  seller  bank  to increase  its  loan  loss
reserve  considerably.
25  See  Eichengreen  and  Portes  (1988)  for  similar  arguments  in terms  of
the  debt  crisis  of the  1920's.
26  The  secondary  market  price  will  now  be defined  as before  with the
exception  that  a is replaced  by c.-23-
is  due  to the  marginal  saving  of resources  that  would  have  been  wasted
in  the  event  of a partial  default.
The  effect  of  a $1 of  buyback  on the  debtor's  expected  future  debt
payments  is  given  by a reduction  in  debt  payment  of $(l/p)  in  all  the
good  states  that  occur  with a  probability  of (1-G*).  As (c)  gets
smaller,  the  price,  which  reflects  the  present  expected  value  of what
accrues  to the  creditors  (see  equation  4 with  a replaced  by c),
decreases.  Thus,  the  expected  reduction  in future  repayments  in  the  good
states  increases  per  unit  of  buyback.  The  debtor  country  will  be
relatively  better  off  with  a  buyback  when  c is  small  and  b and  r are
large,  but in  general,  can  still  be expected  to  lose  from  a buyback.
Indeed,  it is  easy  to  verify  that  even  in the  extreme  case  where  c-0,
the  added  benefit  of  a $1  of  buyback  does  not  offset  the  risk  shifting
effect  unless  the  debtor's  discount  rate  is  smaller  than  the  creditors
discount  rate.  To  see  that,  we can  evaluate  equation  (10)  at  c027  . The
effect  on the  debtor  of  a marginal  buy-back  is  then  given  by [-l+br]
which  is  necessarily  negative  when  b<l/r.  As it is  more  likely  that  the
country's  discount  rate  will  be higher  than  the  creditors',  it is  more
likely  that  the  buybacks  will  hurt the  country  and  benefit  the  creditors
when  funded  by reductions  in  consumption,  even  for  large  differences  in
valuation.
Some  of these  effects  are  illustrated  in  figure  5  which  plots  the
total  gains  T(a)  and  the  gain  and  losses  for  the  debtor  D(a)  and  the
creditors  C(a)  as a function  of the  fraction  (a)  of output  that  the
debtor  repays  while  keeping  (c2)  constant  (alternative  we could  have  kept
(a)  constant  and  changed  (c)).  8 The  total  gains  and  tie9  gains  for  the
creditors  initially  increase  with  a and  than  decrease. The  debtor's
; Impose  c-0  in (4),  p-(l/r)(l-G*)  and  plug in (10).
28  The  parameters  used  were  f(I)  - 10,  a - 5,  c  - 0.02,  b - 0.95,  r  -
1.4.
29 The  reason  is that,  for  b > l/r, the  total  gains  and  the  creditors
gains  depend  positively  on the  marginal  density  function  g*,  which,  in-24-
loss is  primarily  due to  the  risk  shifting  effect  and  declines  in (a).
With  high levels  of (a)  the  debtor  is  less  likely  to give  up resources
through  the  buyback  that  were  not  already  at the  effective  disposal  of
the  creditors.
As shown  above,  the  debtor  can  only  expect  to increase  its  welfare
provided  that  b >> l/r.  To show  the  range  of  b > 1/r  for  which  there  is
room  for  gains  for  the  debtor,  we plot  the  total  gains  and  gains  and
losses  for  the  creditors  and  the  debtor  as  a function  of  b in figure  6,
where  T(b)  stands  for  total  gains,  C(b)  stands  for  creditors'  gains  and
D(b)  stands  for  debtor's  gains  as a function  of  b. 30 As can  be seen  from
figure  6,  b has to  be large  to  make  the  buyback welfare  improving  for
the  debtor. 31 Creditors  are  unaffected  by a change  in  b.
Similarly,  the  effect  of  different  values  of r  on the  gaizs  and
losses  can  be plotted.  Figure  7  does  this. 32 The  debtor's  payoff  D(r)  is
only  positive  for  large  values  of r,  which  would  imply  that  the
creditors  must  be more impatient  than  the  country,  something  that  does
not seem  likely  given  the  high real  interest  rates  in  many  HICs.  The
marginal  payoff  for  the  creditors  C(r)  is  not  dependent  on the  level  of
r. The intuition  for  this  result  is that  the  buyback  allows  the  debtor
to  prepay  debt  at a  price  which  reflects  the  creditors'  opportunity
costs  r;  as a result  the  creditors  marginal  payoff  does  not  depend  on
the  level  of r.  33 The total  marginal  payoff  function  T(r)  runs  parallel
to the  debtor's  payoff  function.
3.2  Investment  Incentives
Strong  arguments  for  debt  transformations  and  reductions  can  be
made in situations  of a severe  debt  overhang.  These  arguments  run
parallel  to  those  made in  the  context  of  domestic  bankruptcy  or
financial  distress:34  not  only  does  the  negative  transfer  of resources
reduce  the  amount  of savings  that  can  be used  for  investment  and  growth,
but the  prospect  of  constant  rescheduling  weakens  the  incentives  of
debtor  countries  to cut  consumption  and  increase  investment  sufficiently
to grow  out  of the  crisis.  In effect,  the  constant  negotiations  over  the
"new  money"  packages  that  are  needed  to fill  the  financing  gaps  imply
cease  of the  normal  distribution,  first  increases  and  then  decreases.
30 Other  parameters  are  a  - 0.5,  c  - 0.05  and  r  - 1.4.
31  In terms  of  equations  9  and  10,  b has  to  be larger  than (l/r)[l  + (f
gc(Y+f(I))dG(Y))/(l-G*)].
32  The  parameters  are  a  - 5,  b - 0.95,  a - 0.08,  c - 0.02  and  f(I)  - 10.
3 This  can  also  be shown  using  the  equations  above.  As equation  (11)
shows,  the  gains  for  the  creditors  are  inversely  related  to the  product
of  p and  r. However,  as p is  inversely  related  to r, the  product  pr is
independent  of r.  The  creditors  total  value  of the  claim  does  depend  of
course  on the  level  of r.
4  See  Myers (1977).-25-
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that,  at the  margin,  any improvement  in a debtor's  balance  of  payments
benefits  first  and  mainly  its  creditors.  This  perverse  incentive  effect
of a "Debt  Overhang"  is  reinforced  by the  elusive  nature  of  a potential
restoration  of creditworthiness  and  of a renewed  access  to the
international  financial  markets.
This  view  about  the  interaction  between  investment  incentives  and
the  level  of foreign  debt  has  recently  been described  by Sachs  (1988)
and  by Krugman  (1988)  in  terms  of a "Debt-Relief  Laffer  Curve".  In this
view,  over-indebted  countries  have little  incentives  to  adjust  their
investment/saving  decision  in  a  way that  is  more  compatible  with their
foreign  obligations.  Equivalently,  austerity  measures  (such  as reduced
public  sector  deficits)  aimed  at increasing  investment,  growth,  and  the
future  capacity  to service  foreign  debts  are  less  tempting  when  a large
proportion  of the  return  on these  measures  goes  to the  foreign  creditors
rather  than  to future  consumption.  As a result  the  market  value  of debt
will fall  when the  nominal  value  of debt  increases  beyond  a certain
level.  These  considerations  could  provide  the  creditors  as a collective
group  with  a good  reason  to  write  down  the  nominal  value  of their  claims
(or  to reduce  the  interest  rate  charged  in rescheduling  agreements),  as
it  would  increase  the  market  value  of claims.
At least  conceptually,  one  can  show  that  a reduction  in  the  debt
face  value  can  increase  the  incentives  to adjust.  Actually,  one  can  show
that  the  first  best  cooperative  response  to  an overhang  involves
contingent  debt  write-offs:  in  the  aftermath  of bad  shocks,  the  debtor
must  know that  it  will  not  be asked  to  repay  all  the  fruits  of its
adjustments  efforts  and  in  good  states  of  nature  the  debtor  must  be
asked  and  is  willing  to repay  more. 35 But  in reality,  such  agreements
are  hard  to implement  without  a strong  enforcement  and  monitoring
agency,  an identification  of the  truly  exogenous  shocks,  and  the
35  See  Froot  et al. (1988).-27-
resolution  of free  riding  problems.  Short  of a first  best  resolution,
uncontingent  d,ebt  transformations  and  reductions  can  be interesting  for
the  creditors  as a second  best  alternative  for  those  debtor  countries
suffering  from  an  acute  overhang.
But  creditors  have  consistently  rejected  the  notion  of simply
writing  off  and  extinguishing  loans. 36 There  are  two  possible  reasons
for  this  position:  (i)  empirical  evidence  shows  that  for  most  debtor
countries  it is  likely  that  thg  value  to the  creditors  of the  option  of
collecting  in  good  states  of  nature  exceeds  the  efficiency  gains
generated  by write-offs,  i.e.,  most  debtor  countries  are  on the  side  of
the  Laffer-curve  which  is  upwards  sloping;37  and (ii)  in the  rare  cases
where  write-offs  can  become  profitable  to the  creditors  group  as  a
whole,  free-rider  problems  within  the  creditors  coalition  may  prevent
such  actions,  with  small  creditors  refusing  to sacrifice  their  claims
for  the  good  of the  group  and  large  creditors  refusing  to foot  the  bill
all  by themselves  without  a fair  burden  sharing. 
38
Given  these  constraints  on creditors,  market  b4sed  debt  operations
initiated  by the  debtor  could  be a  way to  accomplish  beneficial  debt
transformaticns  and  reductions  within  a competitive  creditors  coalition.
The  creditors  may  allow  buybacks  which  directly  reduces  the  total  amount
of  nominal  claims  without  the  problems  of free-riding.  At the  same  time
the  h'uyback  might  provide  on  net  the  proper  incentives  for  the  debtor  to
36 The  Institute  for  International  Finance  has recently  stated  that  debt
forgiveness--that  is  mandatory  debt  cancellation--  is  not in  the
interest  of the  highly  indebted  countries  and that  banks  would  require
compensation  if  creditors'  countries  governments  were to  consider  such
scheme.  Evidently,  this  organization  representing  the  major  banks  does
not  consider  collective  debt  write-offs  to  be in  the  collective  interest
the  creditors.
In  addition,  very  bad shocks  for  banks  are  likely  to  be  met  by
government  intervention  and  bail  outs,  either  directly  or though  the
forms  of implicit  and  explicit  deposit  insurance,  making  write-offs  less
attractive.
38  See further  Sachs  (1989)  who  argues  that  the  free-rider  problem  is
the  main issue  preventing  writeoffs.-28-
grow  and  adjust  faster  and thus  to repay  more  in the  long  run.  A
precondition  is  that  the  debt  reduction  be a  positive  sum  game,  i.e.,
that  the  total  future  resources  increase  as a result  of the  buyback.  We
will  model  this  by assuming  that  investment  reacts  positively  to  debt
reduction.
We use  the  same  setup  as we did  above.  We will introduce  the
parameter  d  which  indicates  the  sensitivity  of investment  to income,
i.e.,  dI/dX  - -d.  A negative  d implies  that  investment  will  increase  as
a result  of the  buyback  as the  reduction  in  the  debt  overhang  removes
some  of the  disincentives  of investing.  In  section  2.1  and  2.2  we used
d-O  and  d-l  respectively.  Aggregate  consumption  will  thus  be reduced  by
the  amount  of the  buyback  plus the  increase  in investment,  i.e.,  dC,/dX
_ (-l+d).  39
Doing  the  math,  we can  show  that  the  welfare  effects  are  given  by:
Proposition  4.  A marginal  buyback  that  affects  investment  produces  the
following  marginal  effects  on the  value  of the  game  and  on the  payoffs
of the  debtor  and  the  creditors:
(12)  dE(W)/dX  - - 1  +  d + b[-G*(l-a)f'd  +  (l-G*)/p  - (l-G*)f'd]
(13)  Ddp/dX  - (l/r)[r  - G*af'd  - (l-G*)/p]
(14)  dE(W)/dX  +  Ddp/dX-  d  +  (b-l/r)[G*af'd+(l-G*)/p]  - bf'd
The  special  case  b-1/r  (the  total  gains  reduces  to  d(l-f'/r))  shows
clearly  that  the  buyback  will only  be a  positive  sum  game  when either
38  Froot  (1988)  derives  d  endogenously  by the  optimization  of the
country's  welfare  with  respect  to investment.  Using  that  approach  here,
we can  derive  that  dI*/dX  - -[f'g(Y*)/p]/[f''(l-aG*)  +  f'ag(Y*)f'],
which  is  >  0  by virtue  of the  fact  that  the  denominator  is the  second
order  condition  for  the  optimal  level  of investment.  The  lower  the  debt
level,  the  higher  the  expected  returns  will  be and  the  higher  investment
will  be.  Of course,  it is  assumed  that  the  marginal  utility  of first  and
second  period  consumption  are  not  affected.  A  more  general  utility
function  would  be U(Cl)  + b(U(C2)).  Future  debt  obligation  will  have in
this  case  a proincentive  and  disincentive  effect  on investment:  on one
hand  a large  debt  obligation  spurs  ir.vestment  as the  marginal  utility  of
second  period  consumption  is likely  to  be high;  on the  other  hand,  the
large  debt  obligation  reduces  the  effective  return  on the  investment.  In
such  a case,  dI*/dX  can  be positive  or  negative  depending  on the
magnitude  of the  income  and  substitution  effects,  which,  as  Helpman
(1987)  shows,  can  depend  on the  degree  of relative  riskaversion.  This
issue  is  also  discussed  by Corden  (1988).-29-
d>O  and  f'<r  or when  d<O  and  f'>r.  The  first  case  was  considered  in
section  2.2  where  d-l: investment  was  reduced  one-to-one  with  the
resources  required  for  the  buyback.  In section  2.1,  we examined  the  case
with  d-O.  The  case  d<O is  the  one  that  ties  in  with the  debt  relief
Laffer  curve:  the  reduction  in  nominal  debt  leads  to an increase  in
investment,  which,  assuming  profitable  investment  opportunities
evaluated  at the  world  interest  rate,  leads  to  surpluses  which  can  be
divided  between  the  debtor  country  and  the  creditors.  For  the
appropriate  combinations  of parameters,  both  parties  can  gain  from  a
debt  buyback:  the  debtor  gains  as  output  at its  disposal  is  sufficiently
increased  to  compensate  for  the  initial  outlay  for  the  buyback  and  the
increase  in investment;  and  the  creditors  gains  as the  market  value  of
remaining  claims  increases.40
We can  split  up the  interesting  cases  for  d>O  and  d<O  by f'>r  and
f'<r,  and  for  a-O  or a-l.  For  convenience  we assume  that  b-1/r  and  we
further  limit  d<l, i.e.  the  buyback  can  not  lead  to  more  than  a one-to-
one  reduction  in investment.  The  different  possible  combinations,
including  the  ones  discussed  in  section  2.1  and  2.2,  and  the
corresponding  gains  and  losses,  as far  as they  can  be signed,  are  now
indicated  in  Table  1.41
The  table  shows  clearly  that  no combination  of the  important
40  Being  on the  wrong  side  of the  debt  relief  Laffer  curve  is  not  a
necessary  condition  for  the  existence  of positive  sum  debt  buybacks  for
the  group  of creditors  as a  whole  and  the  debtor  country  nor  a
sufficient  condition  for  debt  buybacks  that  make  both  parties  better
off.  To see  this,  one  can  use  the  following  analysis.  The  slope  of the
debt  relief  Laffer  curve,  dE(R)/dD,  is  equal  to: (+pG*af'd  +  (1-G*)).
Only  when  d is sufficiently  smaller  than  0 can  the  slope  of the  Laffer
curve  be negative.  However,  for  positive  sum  games  d only  needs  to  be
marginally  smaller  than  0 (and  f'>r,  equation  14).  So,  being  on the
wrong  side  of the  Laffer  curve  is  too  strong  a  condition  for  efficiency
gains  achieved  through  simple  debt  reductions,  but  a necessary  condition
for  implementation  of  market  based  debt  reduction  schemes. This is
another  reflection  of the  inefficiencies  of  non-contingent  debt
feductions.
A detailed  discussion  of each  of the  cases  is  found  in  apppendix  two.-30-
variables  assure  that  the  debtor  gains  from  the  buyback:  even  if the
buyback  is  an overall  positive  sum  game  the  debtor  can  still  lose.  In
five  combinations  of  parameters  it can  not  unequivocally  be determined
whether  the  debtor  loses  or gains.  However,  restricting  the  marginal
return  on investment  to realistic  values,  it  is  more  likely  that  the
debtor  loses. 42 The  debtor  is  only  likely  to gain  when (a)  is large  and
the  buyback  is  a positive  sum  game,  i.e.  either  d>O  or f'<r  or d<O  and
f'>r.  The creditors  come  out  ahead  in  all  but  two  cases.  They  are  even
likely  to gain  in  cases  of  parameters  which  indicate  that  the  buyback  is
a negative  sum  game.
Table  1.
Gains  and  Losses  for  Creditors,  Debtors  and  Total
cases  Creditors  Debtor  Total
d>O  f'<r  +  -+
a-0
f'<r  ?  ?  +
a-l
d>0  f'>r  +
a-0
f'>r  ?  ?
a-I
d<O  f'>r  +  ?  +
a-0
f'>r  +  ?  +
a-l




42  For  instance  for  d--l,  a-0,  r-l,  f'  has to  be larger  than  two  in
order  for  the  buyback  to  generate  returns  to the  country.  The incentive
effects  and  the  marginal  ret-a,rns  would  have to  be quite  large.-31-
3.3  Empirical  Evidence
A large  number  of theoretical  observations  have  been  made  here,  and
at other  places  (Sachs  (1988),  Claessens  and  Diwan  (1989),  Aizenman  and
Borenzstein  (1988),  Krugman  (1988),  Froot  (1989)),  on the  disincentive
effects  of a debt  overhang.  However,  so  far  no empirical  estimates  of
the  exact  magnitudes  of these  effects  on investment  and  adjustment  are
available.  What  is available,  are  estimates  of the  relationship  between
the  secondary  market  prices  of LDC  debt  and  the  countries'  respective
amounts  of external  debt  outstanding, the  latter  relative  to standard
creditworthiness  variables.  Examples  of this  works  are  Sachs  and
Huizinga  (1987),  Vatnick  (1988),  Purcell  and  Orlanski  (1988)  and  Cohen
(1988).  Usually  these  equations  relate,  relying  on  estimates  from
cross-sectional  pooled  time  series  regressions,  the  secondary  market
price  to  variables  like  debt-to-GNP,  debt-to-exports  ratios,  and  dummies
for  factors  such  as time,  the  existence  of  a debt-equity  program,
arrears  and  the  classification  of loans  to the  country  by regulators.  A
typical  equation  would  be the  one  reported  by Sachs  and  Huizinga  (1987)
where  the  secondary  market  price  is  a function  of (with  the  sign  of the
parameter  in  parenthesis)  the  debt  to  GNP  ratio  (-),  average  GNP  growth
over  the  last  five  years  (+),  a  dummy  indicating  whether  the  country  has
unilateral  suspended  debt  service  repayments  (-)  and  a dummy  indicating
whether  the  US regulators  have required  an  allocated  reserve  (-).  In
other  equations,  the  existence  of  a debt-equity  conversion  program  has
been  used  and  there  the  dummy  entered  positively.
These  (cross-country)  price  equations  can  be used to  derive
individual  country's  debt  relief  Laffer  curves,  as for  instance  done  by
Claessens  (1988)  and  indicated  by Cohen  (1988),  assuming  that  the
secondary  market  prices  apply  to all  external  claims.  Basically
Claessens  uses  the  linear  price  equation  from  Sachs  and  Huizinga  [i.e.,-32-
P - a  +  b(D/GNP)  +  c(GNPgrowth)  +  .. ]  to derive  the  equation  for  the
market  value  of debt [  V - P*D  - aD  + bD*(D/GNP)  +  cD*(GNPgrowth)  +  .. ].
The latter  equation  is  nothing  else  than  the  debt  relief  Laffer  curve  if
all  "exogenous"  variables,  i.e.,  all  non-debt  variables,  are  entered
into  the  equation.  Taking  then  the  derivative  with  respect  to D and
setting  this  to zero  gives  the  debt-to-GNP  level  at which  the  market
value  of debt is  maximized. 43
The  conclusion  of this  usage  of  empirical  evidence  is that  only  a
few  countries  seem  to  be on the  side  of the  Laffer  curve  for  which  the
market  value  of debt  declines  when the  nominal  face  value  of debt
increases.  Claessens  only  found  Bolivia,  Zambia  and  Sudan  to  be on the
wrong  side,  with  Peru  and  Ivory  Coast  being  marginal  cases,  while,  in
his research,  Cohen  only  found  Sudan,  Nicaragua,  Peru  and  Bolivia  to  be
within  a 10%  confidence  level  of  being  on the  wrong  side.  In other
words,  according  to  this  evidence,  only for  a limited  number  of
countries  is  reduction  of the  nominal  amount  of debt  in  the  interests  of
the  collective  creditors.
This  would  imply  that  market  implementation  of debt  reduction
schemes,  when schemes  are  evaluated  narrowly,  would  be precluded  for
most  countries  as the  market  value  of  debt  does  not increase  with  a
reduction  in the  nominal  amount  of debt  and  subsequently  the  remaining
creditors  would  stand  to lose  and  block  the  transaction.  However,  it
might  still  be that  positive  gains,  other  than  those  gains  that  reflect
themselves  directly  in L.he  debt  relief  Laffer  curve,  can  be achieved
through  market  based  debt  reduction  schemes.  To these  other  efficiency
gains  we will turn  now.
43  A similar  approach  would  be to  use  the  elasticity  of the  price
equation  with  respect  to the  level  of nominal  debt.  The  elasticity  would
indicate  on which  side  of the  debt  relief  Laffer  curve  the  country  is:
an elasticity  larger  than  one indicates  that  the  market  value  decreases
as debt  is increased,  and  vice-versa.-33-
3.4  Signalling  Creditworthiness  with Buybacks
As mentioned  in  section  3.1,  a  wedge  between  expected  repayments
made  and  received  can  exist  if the  debtor  ascribes  a  higher  probability
of full  repayment  than  the  creditors  do  and the  creditors  are  not  aware
of this.  However,  public  buybacks  done  consistently  over  a  period  of
time  would  release  this  information  and  drive  the  price  of debt  up.
Another  interesting  hypothesis  in  this  context  is that  large  enough
debt  buybacks  can  act  as a credible  signal  of creditworthiness  and
generate  secondary  benefits,  even  if (the  announcement  of)  the  buyback
releases  this information  and  drives  up the  price  at  which  the
transaction  is  operated.  Thus,  even  when  the  buyback  in  itself  hurts  the
debtor,  the  secondary  gains  from  signalling  its  'true'  creditworthiness
can  outweigh  these  primary  losses.  The  secondary  gains  can  include
better  terms  on rescheduled  debt,  more  financing  from  multilateral
institutions,  more  direct  investment,  and  a slow-down  of capital  flight
as the  government's  adjustment  operations  become  more  credible.
Acharya  and  Diwan  (1988)  present  such  a signalling  argument  in  the
context  of  a debt  rescheduling  model.  The  starting  point  of the  analysis
is  that,  due  to investment  incentive  considerations,  debt  relief  can  be
profitable  when  given  to  patient  countries  (with  a high  discount  factor
b),  but  not  when  given  to impatient  countries  (with  a low  b).  The
rationale  for  this  is that  a lot  of relief  is  needed  to get  the
impatient  countries  to increase  investment  and  thus  increases  debt
collection  in the  bad  states,  and  that  this  will  not  be profitable  for
the  creditor  banks  given  the  prospects  of collecting  the  whole  debt  in
the  good  states.  It  will  be profitable  to give  relief  to  patient
countries  as those  will invest  in response.  However,  the  rate  of time
preference  b is  unobservable  by the  creditors  and  they  might  be better
off  not  giving  relief  to any  debtor  rather  than  giving  relief  to  all
debtors.  In the  absence  of debt  relief  for  the  patient  debtors,  an-34-
opportunity  for  Pareto  improvement  is lost.  Acharya  and  Diwan (1989)
show  that  debt  buybacks  and  debt  equity  swaps  could  be a  costly
mechanism  which  signal  the  willingness  of the  debtor  to  use the  future
resources  made  available  by debt  relief  to increase  investment  rather
than  consumption.  As a result,  countries  with large  debt  equity  swap
programs  will  be given  relief,  which  is  hypothesized  to occur  through
relatively  better  terms  on rescheduled  debt,  than  for  those  countries
with  no or small  swap  programs.  Empirically,  the  hypothesis  that  bank
spreads  are  lower  when  a swap  program  is  in place  could  not  be rejected
at a significance  level  of 5  percent.  This  fact  that  swap  programs  are
perceived  by the  market  as good  news is  also  confirmed  by various
secondary  market  price  regressions.  In  particular,  Purcell  and  Orlanski
(1988)  report  that  the  existence  of a swap  program  increases  a  country's
debt  price  by about  16  percent  over  the  debt  price  of a country  with
otherwise  similar  characteristics.44
3.5  Creditors  Coalition  Concerns
As  we saw,  coordination  failures  within  the  creditors  coalition  can
prevent  debt  reductions  even  when  the  group  benefits  as a  whole.  In
particular,  individual  creditors  will realize  that  they  can  potentially
get  a better  deal  by refusing  to participate  in  coordinated  debt
reduction  attempts  and  by free  riding  on  other  parties.  The  net  effect
of is  an increase  in  the  bargaining  power  of the  creditor  group.4 5 But
44  Another  analysis  of  asymmetric  information  in the  context  of debt-
equity  swaps,  however  with  a different  conclusion,  is  Errunza  and  Moreau
(1987).  In their  model  the  asymmetric  information  is  between  the  bank
selling  its  claim  and  the  multinational  investing  in the  country.  The
multinational  is  assumed  to  posses  the  same  set  of information  as the
country  does.  Under  the  postulated  information  setting,  and  assuming
rational  expectations,  a  debt-equity  swap  can  not  be strictly  preferred
by any  party.  Any  activity  by the  multinational  will  reveal  any  "inside"
information  and  prevent  any  positive-sum  game.  In  essence,  Errunza  and
Moreau  (page  2) find  that:  "a  lemons  market  holds,  but in  reverse  since
the  seller  (the  bank)  is less  informed".
45  The reservation  utility  of the  creditors  will  not  be the  one  under  a
scenario  of  collective  action  but  the  one  under  the  constraint  of the-35.
in a  situation  of a  debt  overhang  this  is  not  necessarily  in the
interests  of the  creditors:  the  debtor  country  will  correctly  perceive
the  implicit  tax  rate  on future  output  to  be larger  with a  creditors
coalition  which  is  not  coordinated,  and  investment  will  be lower.46
For this  reason,  debt  buybacks  (and  exit  bonds)  might  be profitable
to the  debtor  and  to large  creditors  as they  allow  certain  "fringe"
creditors  such  as small  banks  to  withdraw,  strengthening  cooperative
behavior  and  allowing  for  more  efficient  agreements. 47 The  banks  that
remain  in the  lending  business  will  be those  that  have some  long  term
strategic  interest  in the  countries  involved  and  might  be more inclined
to search  for  long  term,  efficient  solutions. 48
It is interesting  to  note  that  regulatory  and  accounting  practices
in  the  US encourage  small  creditors  relatively  more  than  large  creditors
to  participate  in  VDRT.  Current  accounting  and  regulatory  practices  can
oblige  a  bank  which  sells  a  part  of its  loans  to  a given  country  to  mark
freeriding,  something  which,  in  the  case  of a debt  overhang,  will  not
necessarily  be in the  group  interest  of the  creditors.  See  Fernandez  and
f.aaret  (1988).
This can  been  easily  shown  in  th3  model  of section  3  by increasin 6
(a).  This  will  produce  a Laffer  type  of curve  as investment  reacts
negatively  to the  size  of (a).  Of course,  current,  as opposed  to future,
taxing  power  is  also increased,  which  increases  the  current  transfers  to
creditors,  something  which  has  to  be weighted  against  the  incentive
effects  on investment.
47 Valdes-Prieto  (1987)  presents  what  he calls  the  "weakening  of the
bank  cartel  theory"  to  explain  debt  - .nversions.  As debt  conversions
affect  the  bargaining  game  between  .ae  bank  cartel  and  the  debtor
country,  it  matters  whether  debt  conversions  are  permitted  after  a
rescheduling  has  been  agreed  upon. Under  his theory,  the  creditors
groups  as a  whole  looses  from  debt  conversions,  but international  banks,
which  will  convert  early  in  comparison  to  regional  banks,  will  gain.  The
country  will  gain  from  debt  conversions,  but  will  default  with a  higher
probability.  There  is  an incentive  for  the  individual  bank  to convert
first  as the  converted  claims  are  senior  to  the  old  claims.  However,
Valdes-Prieto  does  not  address  the  issue  of the  sharing  clauses  which
would  prevent  individual  banks  from  converting  their  claims  against  the
interests  of the  remaning  banks.
48 The  fact  that  the  relative  exposures  of the  large  banks  have
increased  in  the  recent  years  suggests  indeed  that  smaller  banks  have
relatively  withdrawn,  and  thus,  that  potentially  the  chances  of
cooperative  behavior  have  increased.  Sachs  (1989),  however,  argues  that
the  bargaining  power  will  more likely  be increased  as  a result  of the
concentration  of claims  and  that  the  country  will  be worse  off.-36-
down  its  whole  portfolio  of loans  to the  country.  For  large  US banks,
this  would  mean  taking  losses  that  are  so large  as to  wipe out  a large
portion  of reserves.  This  could  be a further  reason  why  large  banks'
participation  in  VDRT  has  been  minimal.4 9
3.6  Differences  Among  Creditors.
There  have  been  a few  recent  attempts  to formalize  behavior  within
the  creditor  group  (Williamson  (1988),  Fernandez  and  Kaaret  (1988)  and
Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1988)).  Williamson  (1988)  uses  differences  in
valuation  between  a "pessimist"  and  a "optimist"  group  to argue  that
debt  transformation  schemes  are  Pareto  improving  operations.  In  his
framework,  pessimists  sell  at a price  above  their  own  valuation  and  gain
from  their  point  of view.  The  optimists  and  the  country  are  glad  to see
the  debt  reduced  at a price  they  consider  a  bargain.  In fact,  Williamson
chooses  a quite  neutral  setup  to  make  his  point:  the  funds  used  for  the
buyback  would  have  been  paid  to  the  creditors  anyway.  In  this  case,
buybacks  do  not  affect  the  welfare  of either  creditor  group  as long  as
there  was  no probability  of the  country  fully  repaying  its  debt.  But
now, this  neutrality  is  somewhat  offset  by differences  in  valuation
among  creditors.  Because  of  valuation  differences  between  pessimists  and
optimists  both  group  of creditors  will  perceive  that  they  have gained  in
the  transaction:  the  debtor  remains  indifferent. 50 The  buyback  remains
in these  examples  a zero-sum  game  with  apparent  rather  than  real  gains.
49  For  some  information  on the  distribution  of  claims  among  banks  and
the  capacity  of individual  banks  around  the  globe  to  sustain  losses  on
their  LDC  exposure  see:  Huizinga  (1989),  a report  by the  Government
Accounting  Office  in  early  1989,  and  statements  made for  House  and
Senate  Committees  in  January  and  February,  1989  by federal  bank
supervisors  in relation  to the  debt  crisis.
50  Williamson's  example  can  be easily  translated  in  terms  of equations
(6)  and (7)  of section  2.2.  The  country  never  fully  repaid  its
obligation  and  therefore  G*-l  and (l-G*)-O;  as the  foreign  exchange  is
always  available  to the  creditors,  a-l  and  thus,  f'(l-aG*)-O  implying
that dEW/dX - 0  and Ddp/dX - 0.-37-
To see  this  more  clearly,  consider  Williamson's  example:  optimists
hold  80%  of a claim  on a debt  service  of $100  and  pessimists  hold 20%.
The  possible  states  of  nature  are  good  with a foreign  exchange  surplus
available  for  debt  service  of $80  and  bad  with  a surplus  cf $20.  In
addition  the  country  has  $10 in  foreign  exchange  reserves  which  is
available  either  for  debt  service  next  period  or for  a debt  buyback  this
period.  Optimists  attach  a probability  of 2/3  to the  good  outcome  and
1/3  to the  bad.  The  pessimists  believe  that  the  probability  of the  good
outcome  is  only  1/3  and  the  probability  of a  bad  outcome  is 2/3.
Assuming  risk  neutrality,  the  optimists  will  value  the  debt  service  then
at $0.70  and  the  pessimists  at $0.50.  The "correct"  debt  price  is taken
to  be $0.66,  the  weighted  average  of the  optimists'  and  pessimists'
valuations.
For  any  price  in  between  $0.50  and  $0.66  the  country  can  use its
reserves  to  buy  out  the  pessimists,  making  them  better  off,  while  at the
same  time,  the  remaining  creditors'  welfare  will  be increased,  as their
valuation  of the  debt  rises  from  $0.70  to  $0.75,  assuming  the  buyback
was  done  at $0.50.  The  country  is  equally  well  off  and  pays the  same  in
all  states  of  nature  as it  would  have foregone,  under  Williamson's
assumptions,  $10  of foreign  exchange  reserves  for  debt  service  anyhow.
The  results  are,  however,  drastically  different  if  we would  have
assumed  that  debt  service  was  only  $80  instead  of $100.  In this  case  the
country  would  have  been  able  to  keep  some  of the  foreign  exchange  in the
good  states  of nature.  As it turns  out  in  this  case  the  buyback,  even  at
the  pessimists'  price  would  have  hurt the  optimists,  and  the  pcuntry
would  have  benefitted  as total  payments  would  have  decreased. The
basic  reason,  as explained  in section  2.2,  is  that  for  a-l  and  for  the
buyback  coming  out  of investment  with f'-l,  the  country  gains  and  the
creditors  lose  as the  buyback  increases  the  chances  for  the  debtor  of
getting  a good  state  using  resources  that  would  have  been at the
disposal  of the  creditors  in the  next  period  otherwise.  This  reasoning
is  of course  conditional  on the  country  being  able  to  keep  some  of it
reserves  in  some  states,  something  Williamson  assumed  was  not the  case.
In  Williamson's  setup  optimists  would  have  gained  if  they  bought
out  the  pessimists  at their  own,  low  price  and  a  buyback  by the  country
would  not  have  been  necessary  for  "overall"  gains.  Williamson  mentions
some  reasons  wby  optimists  do  not  buy  out  the  pessimists  themselves  if
they  really  perceive  the  pessimists'  price  to  be too  low.  Regulatory
constraints  and  strategic  considerations  can  partly  explain  why these
market  equilibrating  phenomena  will  not take  place.  However,  it  might  be
that  these  differences  alone  can  not  account  for  the  differences  in
prices  which  might  be necessary  to  make  debt  buybacks  under  Williamson's
scenario  "profitable"  for  all  involved.  In  addition,  the  reason  why the
country  would  want to  engage  in  debt  buybacks  is  unclear.  Assuming  that
the  country  holds  the  "average"  beliefs  of the  pessimists  and  the
optimists  regarding  the  possible  states  of nature,  one  can  show  that  the
country  is  worse  off  if it  had to  buy  back  the  pessimists  above  their
ex-ante  valuation,  a likely  possibility.  Large  price  differences  might
be necessary  to  make  debt  reduction  schemes  work  under  this  scenario.
51  See  Appendix  3 for  a  detailed  analysis  of the  sensitivity  of
Williamson's  model.-38-
4. Contract  Transformation
The  issue  of  contract  transformations  of external  obligations,
predominantly  swapping  existing  general  obligation  finance  for  other
forms  of external  finance,  should  be discussed  against  a standard  of
what  characteristics  constitute  "good"  external  finance.  A
transformation  of  claims  could  provide  the  possibility  of gains  for  both
the  debtors  and  creditors  when  better  characteristics  are  introduced.
Lessard  (1989)  and  Lessard  and  Williamson  (1985)  provide  a  very  useful
taxonomy  of the  characteristics  cf good  finance.  We will  use  Lessard's
taxonomy  here  to discuss  some  of the  characteristics  found  in  debt
transformations.  We will then  evaluate  two  common  forms  of contract
transformation,  exit  bonds  and  debt-equity  swaps,  along  these  lines  as
they  are  often  thought  to  be "better" contracts.
4.1  More  efficient  financial  contracts
Lessard  classifies  alternative  forms  of finance  along  three
dimensions:  1)  costs,  2)  degree  of  risk-sharing  and,  3) degree  of
managerial  participation  in  the  project  or enterprise  financed.
Instruments  that  score  low  on costs  and  high  on the  other  dimensions  are
in  general  preferred.  General  obligation  finance,  as in  the  form  of
commercial  bank lending  for  example,  is  low  on  expected  costs,  but
involves  little  or no ex-ante  risk  sharing  and  no managerial
involvement.  Other  alternatives,  commodity  bonds,  direct  investment,
portfolio  investment,  quasi-equities,  non-recourse  finance,  etc.,  can  be
similarly  be classified  along  these  dimensions. 52 As perhaps  can  be
expected,  several  of these  external  financing  instruments  can  be shown
to  dominate  traditional  forms  such  as commercial  bank lending  on one  or
more  aspects.  All  financial  instruments  can (potentially)  be ranked
52  Many  existing  (and  potential)  instruments  can  be shown  to  be
combinations  of these  instruments.-39-
through  (welfare)  comparisons  involving,  for  example,  a comparison  of
the  relative  tradeoffs  of the  debtor  vis-a-vis  the  tradeoffs  of the
creditors  regarding  the  level  of costs  versus  the  uncertainty  of costs,
e.g.,  the  relative  degrees  of riskaversions.  As a consequence  of the
dominance  of,  or preference  for,  some  other  than  existing  forms  of
external  financing,  contract  transformations  that  result  in  a larger
component  of these  type  of instruments  in the  overall  basket  of the
country's  external  liabilities  can  represent  a positive-sum  game.53
4.2  Exit  Bonds
Exit  bonds  amount  to  a reduction  in  the  future  nominal  claims  of
the  creditors  on the  country  with  no effect  on the  availability  of
current  resources.  Thus,  the  debtor  country  cannot  lose.  However,  the
creditors  as a whole  will lose  unless  efficiency  gains  are  unlocked.  If
the  exit  bond is  made senior  to the  remaining  debt,  the  remaining
debtholders  stand  to lose  even  more.54  In  order  for  the  exit  bond to  be
acceptable  to  all  parties  --  a  precondition  to  make  the  instrument  more
senior  compared  to  the  remaining  debt,  new  and  remaining  debtholders
must  be at least  as  well  off.  For  new  debtholders  the  issue  is  clear:
they  would  not  convert  their  existing  claims  in the  new  instrument  if
they  did  not  perceive  it to  be of at  least  equal  value.  The  voluntary
character  of the  transaction  will  take  care  of this.  Remaining  creditors
would  only  be willing  to decide  jointly  to  make  the  exit  bonds  legally
senior  if  they  are  at least  as well  off  afterwards,  i.e.,  if their
existing  claims  do  not  decline  in  value  by  becoming  junior,  which
requires  positive  sum  gains.  Some  efficiency  gains  from  debt  reduction
53  In Lessard's  words,  the  debt  relief  Laffer  curve  moves  up as  a result
of the  introduction  of  better  forms  of  external  finance  through  debt
Wansformations.
To the  extent  that  the  reduction  in  future  nominal  claims  reduces  the
second  period  marginal  rate  of utility,  optimal  investment  may  be
reduced.-40-
are thus  necessary  to  make the  exit  bond  acceptable  to  all  creditors. 55
Important  points  for  the  efficiency  gains  are: (i)  If the  remaining
creditor's  claims  are  reduced,  they  will  only  allow  the  swap  if they
believe  that  there  are  some  offsetting  gains.56  (ii)  If indeed  the
remaining  debtholders  gain,  the  debtor  must  gain  at least  as  much to
compensate  for  the  larger  expected  repayments.(iii)  The  debtor  does  not
need to sacrifice  any  current  resources  in  an exit  bond (as  in  the  debt
buyback)  and  stands  thus  more  likely  to  gain from  an exit  bond  than  from
a  buyback.  The  Pareto-improvement  might,  thus,  be easier  to  establish
for  exit  bonds  than  for  debt  buybacks  as the  effect  of  exit  bonds  is
limited  to an incentive  effect  on investment.57  But, in  practice,  it is
difficult  to legally  establish  the  seniority  of the  new instrument
without  some  assurances  in the  form  of collateral.  However,  a cash
collateral  makes  the  exit  bond  a partial  buyback  with  no efficiency
gains.
4.3  Debt-Equity  Swaps
To analyze  debt-equity  swaps  more  clearly,  it is  useful  to split  up
a  debt-equity  swap  into  two  transactions:  a buyback  of debt in  the
secondary  market  using  foreign  exchange  and  a selling  of  rights  to
ss  Froot  (1988)  discusses  the  similarity  of exit  bonds  and  pure  debt
relief.
56  Valdes-Prieto  (1987)  presents  some  further  explanation  for  debt
conversion  schemes  which  he calls  the  "claims  dilution  theory".  Debt
equity  swaps  by moneycenter  banks  result  in  claims  on the  country  which
have  priority  over  claims  of remaining  banks  on the  country's  foreign
exchange,  which  leads  to  wealth  transfers  between  the  creditors  from
regional  to  moneycenter  banks.  Regional  banks  will  not lend  to the
country  anymore  and  secondary  market  prices  will  fall  as  debt-equity
rwaps  get imnlemented  over  time.
An additional  gain  of exit  bonds  for  the  debtor  can  be that,  if the
debtor  structures  the  exit  bond  correctly  and  makes  a credible  take-it-
or-leave-it  offer,  the  country  might  be able to  maximizes  the  amount  of
debt  relief.  By reducing  the  nominal  value  of debt,  a take-it-or-leave-
it  offer  of exit  bonds ;an  bring  the  country  from  the  wrong  side  of the
Laffer  curve  to a  point  on the  other  side  of the  curve  while  keeping  the
market  value  of the  creditor  claims  constant.  The  exit  bond  maximizes  in
this  way the  amount  of "extractible"  debt  relief.-41-
domestic  investment  for  foreign  exchange.  The  transaction  usually
involves  a sharing  of the  discount  in the  secondary  market  between  the
new  investors  and  the  country.  The  first  step  has  been  analyzed  above
and  was shown  to  be unlikely  a positive  sum  game  if either  consumption
or investment  were  cut.  But,  even  if the  debt  buyback  itself  does  not
lead  to  overall  welfare  improvement,  efficiency  gains  of debt-equity
swaps  could  still  arise  from  the  second  step,  the  promotion  of another
financial  contract  that  is  indexed  to domestic  variables.
The  most  cited  reasons  why  converting  debt  to equity  or to claims
indexed  to  domestic  variables  generates  gains  are: (i)  the  subsidy  or
preferential  exchange  rate  that  is implicitly  granted  to investors  which
use the  swap  program  whet.  the  discount  is shared  between  them  and  the
government  attracts  foreign  investment 58;  (ii)  the  allocation  of
resources  improves  because  of the  development  of the  domestic  equity
market  and  new  regulations  that  remove  restrictions  on foreign  direct
investment,  portfolio  investments  and  foreign  ownership  in  general  lead
to  more  foreign  investment; 59 (iii)  better  risk  sharing  can  lead  to
gains;  (iv)  the  domestic  resource  transfer  can  be less  binding  than  the
external  transfer  constraint  leading  to reduced  overall  costs;  (iv)  the
incentives  to invest  increase;  and  (v)  the  supply  of  voluntary  finance
increases  as the  debtor  contracts  to  sell  its  upward  potential.
The  first  two  arguments  can  be dismissed  as a source  of efficiency
gains.  Subsidizing  foreign  investment  through  shared  discounts  is  not an
efficient  tool  when  compared  to  policies  that  attract  foreign  investment
without  being  tied  to  debt  buybacks.  If  the  macro-economic  enviroment  is
not  conducive  to foreign  investments,  investment  subsidies  will  end  up
being  quite  costly.  Similarly,  financial  liberalizations  and  the  sale  of
domestic  assets  to foreign  investors  can  be achieved  without  linking  the
58  This  is analyzed  by Roberts  and  Remolona  (1987)  who  point  out  the
i9portance  in additionality  in investment.
See  for  instance  Gill  (1987).-42-
proceeds  to debt  buybacks.  In effect,  if  swaps  are  costly,  it  would  be
more  efficient  to  use  other  means  to  subsidize  investments,  develop  the
domestic  financial  markets  and  restore  appropriate  macroeconomic
conditions  for  foreign  investments.
A. Risk  Sharing
Risk sharing  can  be a source  of positive  sum  games.  A swap  replaces
a (implicit)  risk  sharing  rule  by another.  If this  increases  the  gains
from  trading  in  risk  between  the  debtor  and the  international  financial
community,  efficiency  gains  will  be generated.  For  example,  if the  new
contract  reduces  the  risks  of the  debtor,  there  are  efficiency  gains
whenever  the  debtor  is  more riskaverse  (or  less  diversified)  than  the
creditors.  But  even  though  equity  contracts  do imply  risk-sharing,  once
one  accounts  for  the  implicit  risk  sharing  already  embodied  in existing
debt  constracts,  the  conditions  for  positive  sum  games  due  to risk-
sh&.ring  for  small  debt-equity  swaps  are  not  as easily  established. 60
Moreover,  risk  sharing  arguments  become  even  less  appealing  in the
case  of the  swapping  of public  debt.  In that  case,  one  also  needs  to
consider  the  effect  of the  swap  on the  variability  of the  debtor's
government  financing  costs.  In  most  instances,  the  governent  ends  up
reducing  its  foreign  debt  and  increasing  its  domestic  debt (or  stock  of
money). 6' If the  government  is  less  able  to  default  on its  domestic  debt
than  on its  foreign  debt,  risk  is increased  as total  financing  costs
60 See  Helpman  (1988)  for  a similar  graph  and  for  a detailed  analysis
of the  necessary  conditions  on the  levels  of relative  riskaversion  for
positive  sum  debt  transformations.  In figure  9 40%  of the  debt  was
swapped  for  an equity  stake  in the  country  that  paid  3%  of output.  The
value  of the  reduction  in  debt  is  equal  to the  value  of the  new  equity.
61  Valasco  (1988)  develops  a simple  macro  framework  in  which  he analyzes
more rigorously  some  of the  domestic  effects  of a debt-for-equity  swap
and  analyzes  the  differences  between  debt-for-domestic-government-bonds
and  debt-for-domestic-money  swaps  in  terms  of inflation,  fiscal  effects
and  consumption  and  current  account  behavior.  See  Oks (1989)  for  an
assessment  of the  macroeconomic  implications  of debt  reduction  schemes
for  Mexico  and  Morande  and  Schmidt-Hebbel  (1988)  for  Chile.-43-
increase  in  the  bad states  and  decrease  in the  good  states.
We can illustrate  the  effect  of a swap  on the  schedule  of payments
made  by the  debtor  across  states  of nature.  The  equity  contract  pays  out
a  proportion  (e)  of  output  in  all  states  of  nature  while  debt  pays  out  a
proportion  (a)  in states  below  Y* and  a fixed  D in  the  good  states.  We
take  output  Y to  be uniformly  distributed  on [O,Y]-[0,20].  This  allows
us to interpret  the  area  under  each  repayment  curve  as the  expected
repayment  arising  of that  instrument.  As the  swap  is  operated  through  a
competitive  market,  we restrict  the  price  at  which  claims  are  exchanged
so that  the  expected  value  of the  old  and  new  contracts  are  the  same.
This is  achieved  in  figure  8 for  the  extreme  case  in  which  foreign
debt  D(Y) is  entirely  swapped  for  domestic  equity.  For  the  creditors  to
be indifferent  between  the  t4o  instruments,  the  areas  under  the  two
curves  have to  be equal,  i.e,  (e)  must  be large  enough.  Because  equity
gives  the  creditors  a larger  payoff  for  large  values  of  Y, (e)  is
smaller  than  (a).62  Note  that  the  standard  debt  contract  allows  for  somie
risk  sharing  when  Y<Y*,  but  that  equity  claims  allow  for  risk  sharing
over  a larger  spectrum.  Thus,  if the  debtor  is  more  risk  averse  than  the
creditor he would  gain  by swapping  all its  debt  into  equity. 63
But  the  analysis  does  no.  carry  through  completely  for  small  and
medium  sized  swaps.  In fact,  as illustrated  in figure  9, as  a result  of
a small  swap,  the  debtor's  cost  of financing  is  actually  increased  in
the  very  bad and  the  very  good  states,  and  is only  reduced  in the
intermediate  states,  between  Yl and  Y2.  Depending  on the  exact  weighing
of the  state  contingent  payments,  these  small  swaps  can  increase  or
reduce  the  welfare  of a risk  averse  debtor 84.
Finally,  let  us illustrate  the  effect  of  a swap  of  external  public
debt into  internal  public  debt.  This  is  depicted  in  figure  10 for  the
extreme  case  where  domestic  debt  does  not  allow  any  risk  sharing.
Foreign  debt  D(Y)  allows  some  limited  risk  sharing  for  low  values  of  Y;
on the  other  hand,  domestic  debt  B(Y)  pays  out  a costant  amount  of B.
Swapping  half the  foreign  debt into  domestic  debt  results  in  a total
government  obligation  tD'(Y)+B(Y)]  which  allows  less  risk  sharing  than
the  initial  situation:  in fact,  risk  is  now  shared  only  on states  where
Y<Yl,  while  previously  risk  was  shared  for  all  states  up to  Y-Y2.  As a
result,  Pareto  improving  external  public  debt  for  domestic  public  debt
swaps  require  that  the  foreign  creditors  be more  risk  averse  than  the
debtor  government.  This  seems  unlikely  given  the  rich  portfolio  choice
in the  developed  world.  Moreover,  the  increase  in  risk  is exacerbated
when  domestic  financing  is expensive,  either  because  of  high real
interest  rates  or because  of the  inefficiency  of the  inflation  tax.
62  The  value  of the  parameter  imply  that  with  a-0.10,  we must  have
e-0.075  in  order  for  the  two  areas  to  be equal  in  size.
63  The fact  that  this  does  not  happen  is  presumably  explained  by moral
hazard  considerations.  See  Cole  and  English  (1988)  for  such  a  model.
64  In  figure  9,  40%  of the  debt  was swapped  for  an equity  stake  in the
country  that  paid 3%  of output.  The  value  of the  reduction  in  debt is
equal  to  the  value  of the  new  equity.-44-
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B.  External  and  Internal  Transfers
The substitution  of a foreign  exchange  denominated  liability  by a
domestic  liability  in  the  government  budget  constraint  can  have,  in
general,  a real  effect  on  various  macro-economic  variables.  External
debt  servicing  requires  two  types  of transfers:  one  from  the  private
sector  to the  government,  and  one  from  the  government  to the  foreign
creditors.  The first  transfer  imposes  costs  to the  debtor  in terms  of
austerity,  crowding  out  private  investment,  and  of inflationary
pressures  (cost-push).  Moreover,  financial  repression,
disintermediation,  and  capital  flight  are  also  possible  outcomes,
especially,  if  the  government  taxes  the  financial  sector  inefficiently.
Finally,  to  the  extent  that  deficit  financing  raises  real  interests
rates,  it increases  the  costs  of servicing  the  domestic  public  debt.
The second  transfer  requires  an  expansion  of the  tradeable  sector
and  thus  a combination  of  expenditure  switching  and  reduction  through
quantitative  restrictions  and  relative  price  changes.  In general,  these
policies  weaken  the  fiscal  budget:  import  quotas  reduce  economic
activity,  export  subsidies  exercise  direct  budgetary  costs,  and  real
devaluations  increase  the  domestic  burden  of foreign  debt  in domestic
65 terms . As Rodrik  (1988)  has  shown,  because  government's  revenues  in
non-traded  goods  are  likely  to  exceed  its  expenditures  on them,  the  real
depreciation  required  to generate  the  public  and  private  sector  external
surplus  will result  in  an additional  burden  on the  public  budget,  as the
"terms-of-trade"  of the  government  vis-a-vis  the  private  sector
deteriorate.
The  two  transfers  have thus  quite  different  effect  on the
government's  budget  and  quite  different  costs.  The implications  of this
for  debt-equity  swaps  are  not  straightforward,  as at least  three
elements  complicate  the  analysis:
B5 See  Corden  (1989)  for  an elaboration.-46-
(i)  If the  new  domestic  claims  are  held  by foreigners,  their  servicing
will  ultimately  require  an internal  and  external  transfer  in  any  case.
(ii)  Debt-equity  swaps  may lead  to a  more  favorable  timing  of debt
service,  especially  of the  external  transfer. 66
(iii)  In general,  highly  indebted  countries'  governments  service
external  debt at less  than  par  while  domestic  firm  have to  deposit
domestic  currency  at the  central  bank  at the  official  rate  arid  for  the
totality  of their  required  debt  service.  In this  case,  external  debt
reduction  and  debt-equity  swaps  at a discount  imply  an external  price
for  foreign  exchange  which  is  different  from  the  one  at  which  private
and  public  enterprises  service  their  external  debt  internally.  In
effect,  domestic  companies  can  then  have incentives  to  buy  external  debt
at a discount  to  extinguish  their  external  claims  at the  central  bank  at
par.  This  forces  an arbitrage  condition  between  the  discount  on external
debt,  the  black  market  premium  and  the  official  exchange  rate.
C. Incentive  Effects
The  positive  effects  of the  risk  sharing  created  by of debt-equity
swaps  do  have  some  bearing  on the  incentive  argument  of the  associated
debt  reduction.  Debt-equity  swaps  can  more  closely  mimic  a policy  of
state  contingent  write-offs,  a  policy  which  can  constitute  the  first
best  solution  to  a debt  overhang  problem.  Indeed,  when  the  investment
decision  is  made  after  some  more  information  about  the  exact  magnitude
of Y is  revealed  to the  country  (and  risk-sharing  considerations  do not
play  as large  a role),  the  first  best  solution  for  the  creditors  is to
index  the  debt  reduction  with  respect  to  Y. A debt-equity  contract  could
mimic  such  a policy  as it  reduces  debt  and  substitutes  it  with an
indexed  claim.  Debt-equity  swaps  could  for  that  reason  reduce  the
66  Repatriation  of capital  and  dividends  on equity  acquired  through
debt-equity  programs  is  often  restricted  for  a certain  period.-47-
inefficiencies  of a debt  overhang  and  lead  to a  positive  sum  game.67
D. Selling  the  Upward  Potential
Indexed  contracts  can  increase  the  credit  ceiling  of a debtor
because  they  credibly  allow  foreign  investors  to extract  larger
resources  in the  good  states  of nature  when  the  costs  of default  are
large 68. As a result  properly  indexed  instrumerts  are  welfare  increasing
for  countries  that  are  attempting  to regain  creditworthiness  by
increasing  their  credit  ceiling  above  their  stock  of inherited  external
claims.
5. Conclusions
This  paper  has shown  that  there  might  exist  combinations  of prices
and  types  of contracts  under  which  market  based  debt  reduction  and
transformation  schemes  can  benefit  a  highly  indebted  country,  and,  by
virtue  of their  market  character,  not  hurt the  creditors.  No general
statements  can  be made  regarding  the  welfare  implications  of these
schemes.  The  schemes  will  have  to  be evaluated  individually  for  a
specific  country,  for  which,  as the  paper  shows,  simple  present  value
calculations  will  not  be sufficient.  The  benefits  of debt  reduction  and
transformation  schemes,  if  any,  will  often  have to  be due  to  positive
efficiencies  associated  with  the  schemes.  Specifically,  the  paper
discusses  changes  in  the  expected  repayments  on the  remaining  debt  as a
result  of incentives  for  investment  and tdjustment,  different  divisions
67  See  Froot  et al. (1988)  and  Lessard  (1989).  In general  however,
risksharing  and incentive  considerations  will  point  in  different
directions.  An indexed  debt  contract  can  lower  the  after-servicing
return  on investments,  reduce  incentives,  and  can  thus  lead  to lower
investments:  only  because  the  uncertainty  is  additive  (Y)  in  our
example,  this  effect  was  not  present  in  our  example.
68 Diwan  (1989)  derives  the  form  of the  financial  contract  that
maximizes  the  voluntary  supply  of  external  finance  and  shows  that  it
completely  insures  the  debtor.-48-
of repayments  between  creditors,  risksharing  aspects  and  signalling
values  which  can  be associated  with  certain  debt  reduction  and  debt
transformation  schemes.  In general,  the  paper  finds  that  the  conditions
that  have to  be satisfied  in  order  for  these  voluntary  schemes  to
benefit  both  creditors  and  debtor  country  are  fairly  strict  and,  on the
basis  of (scant)  empirical  evidence,  not  easily  observed.
As a  result,  we can  state  that  market  based  debt  reduction  and  debt
transformation  schemes  are  only  likely  to  be welfare  improving  for  the
debtor  when:
(i)  the  debtor's  opportunity  cost  of foreign  exchange  is low  relative  to
world  interest  rates;
(ii)  when there  is  a  large  probability  of a  default  (rescheduling)  with
a  deadweight  loss  to the  creditors  and  when the  cost  and  the
uncertainties  of reschedulings  are  high  and  largely  borne  by the  debtor;
(iii)  when  private  rather  than  public  debt  is  swapped  for  equity
investments;
(iv)  when the  country  has  no other  way  of signaling  its  commitment  and
willingness  to  adjust;
(v)  when the  country  has  an extreme  case  of  debt  overhang.
(vi)  when the  level  of the  country's  tradeable  resources  is  highly
sensitive  to  external  developments  and  risk  sharing  generates  benefits.
(vi)  when  a  country  is  attempting  to regain  creditworthiness  by selling
its  upward  potential.
The  next  research  step  in this  area  will  have to  be careful
empirical  investigations  on  whether  some  of these  conditions  are
satisfied.  An evaluation  of these  schemes  requires  that  we get  a  handle
on the  disincentive  and  proincentive  effects  of a debt  overhang,  the
opportunity  costs  of foreign  exchange,  and the  dead-weight  losses  of
bargaining.  For  this,  it  will  be necessary  to  get  a  better  understanding
of the  formation  of prices  on the  secondary  markets  of LDC  debt.-49-
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Appendix  A.1
A Description f  Debt  Reduction  and  Transformation  Scheme169
A.l.l  Buybacks
Debt  buybacks  involve  a  cash  purchase  of existing  debt  on the
secondary  market.  The  resources  for  the  buyback  usually  come  from  the
country's  foreign  exchange  reserves,  but they  can  also  come  from  outside
grants  given  for  this  specific  purpose.  In  order  for  a  debtor  to  be able
to  openly  use  its  reserves  in  a buyback  operation,  it  needs  the  consent
of  all its  creditors.  There  are  two  good  reasons  for  this.  First,  the
use  of reserves  to repurchase  debt  may  impair  the  debtor's  ability  to
service  the  remaining  debt.  Second,  there  is  a moral  hazard  problem:
countries  could  take  actions  to lower  the  price  at  which  their  debt  is
trading,  allowing  them  to  repurchase  debt  at low  prices,  which  would
-reward  and  possibly  encourage  this  behavior.
For  these  reasons,  two  amendments  to the  loan  contracts  have to  be
made in  order  to allow  an open  buyback:  first,  the  debtor  must  be
allowed  to  prepay  its  loans;  ar.d  second,  participating  banks  must  be
given  waivers  from  sharing  provisions  so that  they  do  not  have to  share
the  payments  they  receive  from  the  debtor  country  with  non-participating
creditors.  Thus,  in  order  for  the  transaction  to  be allowed  to  proceed
all  the  creditors  must  believe  that  the  operation  will  not  hurt  them.
A  recent  example  of  an open  buyback  of  public  debt  is  provided  by
the  Bolivian  1988  operation  in  which  more  than  forty  percent  of
Bolivia's  commercial  indebtednesr  (about  $270  million  of debt  face
value)  was  extinguished  at  a price  of 11 cents  per  dollar  using  donated
funds. 70 It  has  furthermore  often  been  reported  in the  financial  press
that  governments  -but  more  often  private  firms,  have  been  buying  back
their  debts  through  intermediaries  on the  secondary  market.
A.1.2  Securitization
An "exit  bond"  is  a  buyback  financed  by future  cash  flows.  A recent
example  is  provided  by the  Morgan-Mexican  conversion  operation  of
January  1908.  This  was in  fact  a combination  of a buyback  using  reserves
and  an exit  bond  swap.  The  Mexican  offer  was  as follows:  all  creditor
banks  under  the  1987  restructuring  agreements  were invited  to  bid  for  an
exchange  of its  loans  against  a  bond  with  a collateralized  principal.
The  bond  had a 20  year  maturity,  paid  1.625  % over  LIBOR  and  the
principal  was fully  secured  by non-marketable,  zero-coupon  US Treasury
securities.  The 1987  restructuring  agreement  exempted  the  transaction
from  the  sharing  provisions  but  the  negative  pledge  still  had to  be
waived  in  order  to  allow  the  use  of reserves  to  collateralize  the
principal  of the  new  bonds.  The  exit  bond  part  consisted  thus  of the
stream  of interest  payments  on the  reduced  principal.  Creditors  had
furthermore  not  made  the  interest  payments  on the bonds  more senior
compared  to other,  existing  claims  on the  country.1
69  For  a more  complete  description,  see  for  example  World  Bank (1988)
70 The  buyback  was financed  by funds  donated  for  this  purpose.  However,
it  appears  that  most  of these  funds  were  diverted  from  aid-budgets  which
were  aimed  at  Bolivia  in  any  case.  See  further  Lamdany  (1988).
71  Presumably,  if  the  creditors  thought  this  to  be in their  interest,
they  could  have  made  the  bonds  more  senior  than  existing  claims  through
the  appropriate  legal  measures.-53-
From  the  result  of the  auction,  it  appears  that  the  bidders  decided
on their  offering  price  by looking  at the  collateralized  bond as a
collection  of two  instruments:  the  fully  collateralized  principal  as a
US  Treasury  risk,  and  the  promised  interest  payments  as a  Mexican  risk
valued  at the  discount  rate  implicit  in  the  secondary  market  price  of
Mexican  commercial  bank  debt.  Therefore  it appeared  that,  in spite  of
Mexico's  assurances  on the  seniority  of the interest  payments,  the
market  did  not  perceive  the  unsecured  portion 2f  the  exit  bonds  to  be
senior  to  Mexico's  remaining  outstanding  debt.
Other  forms  of securitization  have involved  (or  are  rumored  to
involve)  exchanging  commercial  bank  debt  at a discount  for  commodity
price-indexed  instruments  and  for  bonds  that  73e  collateralized  ihrough
essentially  escrowing  future  export  receipts.
A.1.3 Debt  To Equity  Conversions
Debt-equity  swap  mechanisms  have  been instituted  in  a number  of
countries  including  Argentina,  Brazil,  Costa-Rica,  Mexico,  the
Philippines  and  more  extensively,  in  Chile.  A debt-equity  swap  involves
an investor  exchanging  a country's  debt  at the  central  bank for  local
currency  to  be used in  equity  investments  (usually  with  some
restrictions  on remittances  rights,  on the  type  of investments  and  on
the  sale  of the  equity).  Debt-equity  swaps  fall  into  four  categories:  1)
a  sovereign  or  public  sector  debt is  exchanged  for  equity  in  a  private
sector  enterprise,  either  in  the  form  of  direct  equity  or as portfolio
equity;  o)  debt  of a  private  sector  company  is  exchanged  for  an equity
investment  in  the  same  company; 3)  sovereign  os  public  sector  debt  is
exchanged  for  equity  as  a part  of  a privatization  program  of public
sector  enterprises;  and  4) private  external  debt  of  one  company  is
exchlanged  for  equity  of  another  private  company. Debt-equity  swaps  have
predominantly  been  public-external-debt-for-private-equity  swaps,  but
some  amount  of  private-debt-for-pri'ate-equity  swaps  have  been done.
Similar  to  debt  buybacks,  debt-equity  conversions  require  special
provisions  in  orde.  not to  trigger  the  mandatory  prepayment  clauses.  The
special  provisions  are  commonly  inserted  in  rescheduling  agreements.
Restrictions  on repatriation  of remittances  serve  to  prevent  the  new
investors  from  obtaining  more  advantageous  terms  than  bank creditors.
Recently,  some  debt-equity  conversions  have  been  done  through  conversion
funds  where  foreign  debt  is  converted  into  risk  capital  which  is  pooled
and  used  to fund  longer  term  investment  projects.
There  is  some  evidence  suggesting  that  equity-like  instruments  are
perceived  by creditors  to  be more  valuable  than  debt.  In  Chile  and
Brazil,  where  debt-equity  swap  rights  are  auctioned,  debt is  typically
retired  at a  price  above  secondary  market  prices  (but  still  below  par).
The  enhanced  value  of these  claims  can  be due  to their  (perceived)
seniority  status  and/or  to  the  fact  that  these  equity  claims  can  be sold
on the  domestic  market  and  perhaps  even  be exchanged  for  foreign
currency  without  the  approval  of the  authorities.
A.1.4 Magnitude
72 This  analysis  is from  Lamdany  (1988).
73 Venezuela  has raised  approximately  $500  million  through  essentially
selling  its  oil  exports  receipts  forward.  The  deal  involved
collateralizing  a  bonds  issued  on the  US market  with the  exports
receipts  from  oil.-54-
Table  one  presents  some (preliminary)  indications  of volumes  or
transactions  on the  secondary  market  for  dlfferent  heavlly indebted
countries."  The  volume  figures  include  interbank  transactions  and this
do not  necessarily  represent  debt  reductlons  or debt  transformations.
Table  1
SECONDARY  MARKET  FOR  DEVELOPING  COUNTRY  DEBT 1984-1988
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988a
DEBT  CONVERSIONS  a/
Argentina  31  469  --  35  1328
Brazil  731  537  176  1800  8643
Bolivla  --  --  --  1  349
Chile  11  313  987  1983  3205
Costa  Rica  --  --  7  146  17
Ecuador  --  --  --  125  258
Honduras  --  --  --  6  11
Jamaica  --  --  --  2  100
Mexico  --  769  1023  4804  7402
Peru  - - --  - - 15
Philippines  --  15  266  382
Uruguay  97
Venezuela  --  --  --  --  130
Yugoslavia  --  --  --  --  50
Sudan  --  --  --  --  1
Zambia  - 3
Nigeria  --  --  --  --  120
TOTAL  b/  773  2088  2208  9167  2211G
DEBT  SWAPS  c/  2000  4000  7000  12000  40000
a - Identified  to date  in 1988.
b - Debt for  equity  and  domestic  debt  swaps,  conversions  and  debt
repurchases  and  other  transations  excluding  interbank  trading.
c - All transactions,  including  interbank  trading.
Table  2 indicates  an approximate  division  of the  secondary  markets
transactions  over  debt-equity  swaps,  informal  conversions,  exit  bonds,
buybacks  and other  type  of transactions  involving  the  debtor  country.
Source  for  Table 1  and 2:  estimated  and  compiled  by IECDI,  The World
Bank.  The figures  are  very  preliminary.  See  the  March 1989  issue  of the
Quarterly  Review  of Financial  Flows  to  Developing  Countries  for  some
more  definite  figures  and  additional  information.- 55 -
........  ...........................  ..  ....................  .......  .......................  .....  ................  ..
Table  2
ALL  COUNTRIES
....  _.......................................  ...........  ..........................................  .........  ...  .....
DbtEqty Infmls ExtBds BuyBcks Other
...  ---  ....  . ...  ....
1984  773
1985  1843  245
1986  1494  714
1987  3435  4500  15  1216
1988  8810  5545  4725  648  2382
. _...  ......  .........  ......................  ...  ...  .....  .............  _...  ...... __..-56-
APPENDIX  A.2:  Proofs
A.2.1  Proof  of equation  5:
Since:
Y*
p- (l/[D-X/p])  (f  (a(Y+f(I))]g(Y)dY  +  [D-X/p](l-G*))  it follows  that:
y
dp/dX  - (l/(D-X/p] 2) ( [-(l/p)(l-G*)][D-X/p"]  -
y*
[f [a(Y+f(I))]g(Y)dY+[D-X/p*](1-G*)](-l/pe) 
where  p  is  the  ex-post  price  of the  remaining  debt  which,  at the
margin,  is  not  effected  by the  debt  buyback  as  the  buyback  is  assumed  to
occur  at the  average,  ex-ante  price  and  not at  the  marginal,  ex-post
price  and  where  Y*  - fD-X/po]/a  - f(I).  The  equation  implies  that  at
X-0.
dp/dXx  I  - [-(l/p*)(1-G*)D  +  p*D/p]/D 2
- [1  - (l-G*)/po]/D
- [1  - (l-G*)/p]/D
A.2.2  Proof  of equation  7
(we  assume  in  the  text  that  dI/dX  - -1)




The  equation  implies  that,  at  X-0  where  pe  - p-
dp/dXlx.o  - [(-(l/p)(l-G*)-af'G*)D  +  pD/p]/D2 
- (1  - (l-G*)/p-af'G*J/D
For  large  debt  swaps  the  only  way to  calculate  the  effect  on the  price
and  value  of the  remaining  debt  is to  postulate  a distribution  function
for  Y, a  production  function  f(I)  and  solve  implicitly  (or  obtain  an
explicit  expression  if possible)  for  p in  terms  of ex-post  debt
levels.  To work  out  the  example  mentioned  in  the  text,  and  plotted  in
figure  5, requires  solving  for  p as  a function  of X such  that  p - pe  in
the  equation:
75  Dooley  (1988)  has  done  this  for  a debt  facility,  with funds  for  the
buyback  coming  from  outside  the  country  and  has shown  how the
gains/losses  are  divided  between  the  participating  creditors,  the
remaining  creditors,  the  country  and  the  debt  facility.-57-
Y*
p- [l/(D-X/p)]  fI  f  a(Y+f(I))Jg(Y)dY  +  (D-X/p](l-G*)
where  Y* - [D-X/p]/a  - f(I).
For  the  chosen  distribution  function  this  can  only  be done iteratively
as this  expression  does  not  have  an implicit  solution.
A.2.3  Proof  of Equation  11.
Y*  y*
p- [l/(D-X/p')]  f  [c(Y+f(I))Jg(Y)dY  + f  [D-X/p*]g(Y)dY]/r  1
y  y
with  Y*-[D-X/p]/a-f(I).
it  follows  that:
dp/dX-N/[D-X/p] 2 with
t-  [-(l/pr)((l-G*)-g*[D-X/p](l/a-c/a 2))[D-X/p]
Y*
-1f  [a(Y+f(I))]g(Y)dY  +  [D-X/p](l-G*)](-l/p*r)
y
- -(l/p*r)  ((l-G*)-g*[D-X/p](1/a-c/a2)[D-X/peI  - E[R(X,p)](-l/pr)
evaluating  at  X-O,  we have:
dp/dXlx.o  - [(l/pr)(-(l-G*)+g*D(l/a-c/a 2))D  +  pD/p]/D
2
- [1  - (l-G*)/pr+g*D(l-c/a)/(apr)]/D
Equation  (10)  follows  similarly.-58-
APPENDIX  A.3
Welfare  effects  in  the  general  case
Table  1.
Gains  and  Losses  for  Creditors,  Debtors  and  Total
Cases  Creditors  Debtor  Total
d>O  f'<r  1  d(l-f'/r)-l<O  d(l-f'/r)>O
a-0
fl'<r  1-(l/r)[(l-G*)/p]  -1+(l/r)[(l-C*)/p]  d(l-f'/r)>O
a-1  -df'G*/r<O  d[l-(l-G*)f'/r]OO
d>O  f'>r  1  d(l-f/r)-l<O  d(l-f'/r)<O
a-0
f'>r  1-(l/r)[(l-C*)/p]  -1+(l/r)[(l-C*)/p]+  d(l-f'/r)<O
a-1  -dG*f'/r.oO  d[l-(l-G*)f'/r].OO
d<O  f'>r  1  d(l-f'/r)-l1oO  d(l-f'/r)>O
a-O
f'>r  1+(l/r)[-(l-G*)/p  -l+d+(l/r)[(l-C*)/p  d(l-f'/r)>O
a-1.  -G*f'd]>O  -(l-G*)f'd]oO
d<O  f'<r  1  d(l-f'/r)-l<O  d(l-f'/r)<O
a-0
f'<r  1+(l/r)[-(l-C*)/p  -1+d+(l/r)[(l-G*)/p  d(l-f'/r)<O
a-l  -G*f'd]>O  -(l-G*)f'd]<O
We consider  the  cases  where  d<O,  the  buyback  leads  to  an  increase
in  investment  more  carefully.  For  f'>r  and  when  a-O  the  country  gains
from  a  debt  buyback  as  it  leads  to  an  increase  in  profitable  investment
but  loses  from  the  drop  in  consumption.  As  a  result  dE(W)/dX  - d(l-
f'/r)-l.oO.  The  marginal  return  on  investment  has  to  be  high  enough  to
make  up  for  the  opportunity  costs  of  investment  and  the  drop  in
consumption.  For  example,  for  d--0.5  and  r-l,  f'  has  to  be  larger  than
3,  i.e.  investment  must  yield  more  than  200% marginal  return.  However,
when  a  - 0 it  is  unlikely  that  a  buyback  leads  to  an  increase  in
investment  as  there  are  no  disincentive  effects  on  investment  associated
with  a  debt  overhang:  the  'tax'  effect  of  debt  in  bad  states  is  zero  as
a  is  zero  and  the  buyback  is  thus  not  necessary  to  remove  any
disincentive  effects.  The  debt  buyback  is  more  likely  to  reduce  than  to
increase  investment  because  of  its  claim  on  current  resources.  Creditors
as  a  group  will  gains  as  dE(R)/dX  - 1;  if  there  is  any  market  value  to
the  debt  at  all,  remaining  debtholders  will  be  indifferent  or  lose  at
the  benefit  of  the  participating  debtholders.
For  f'>r  and  a-1,  the  results  are  as  follows:  dE(W)/dX  - -l+d  +
(l/r)[(l-G*)/p-(l-G*)f'd]  and  dE(R)/dX  - 1  +  (l/r)[-(l-G*)/p-G*f'd].
Apart  from  the  riskshifting  effect,  which  makes  the  country  lose  and  the
creditors  gain,  the  benefit  for  the  country  and  the  creditors  as  a  whole
are  respectively  -d((l/r)f'(l-G*)-l)  and  -(l/r)G*f'd.  This  implies  that
the  country  can  only  gain  if  the  effective  marginal  return  on  the-59-
additional  investment,  (l-G*)f',  is  high enough  to  make  up for  the
opportunity  cost  of first  period  resources  used for  the  investment  as
well  as for  the  negative  riskshifting  effect.  Assuming  that  the
probability  of full  repayment  (1-G*)  is  0.50  and  r-l,  the  marginal
return  f'  has to  be larger  than  2  just  to  make  up for  the  opportunity
costs  of investment,  without  considering  the  negative  risk  shifting
effect.  For  the  creditors,  the  benefits  of riskshifting  are  increased  by
the  benefits  of a  higher  marginal  output  in states  in  which  the  country
defaults  and  as a result  creditors  are  more  likely  to come  out  ahead.  In
some  sense  with a  - 1, the  resources,  if invested,  were  at the  disposal
of the  creditors  all  along  but  have  been  earning  a rate  of return  above
the  world  interest  rate  which  further  increases  the  creditors'  payoff.
For  f'<r  and  a-0,  the  country  will  lose  from  any  additional
investments  as the  gross  return  is  not  even  sufficient  to recover  the
investment.  The  buyback  in itself  will lead  to  no gains  as the  country
is only  prepaying  debt  it  did  not  need to  pay in the  first  place  as a is
zero.  As a net  result  the  buyback  will  hurt the  country.  The  creditors
will gain  as they  receive  payments  they  did  not  expect.
For  f'<r  and  a-l,  the  country  will lose  because  of the  risk
shifting  effect,  -l+(l-G*)/p<O,  and,  because  the  additional  investment
will  be at a loss,  d(l-f'(l-G*))<O,  the  country  will  lose  on the  whole.
The  creditors  will  still  gain  even  though  investment  in itself  is
inefficient  and  overall  there  is  a loss.  The  reason  is that  the
additional  investments  allow  resources  to  be carried  over  to  next
period,  even  though  at an opportunity  loss  compared  to the  international
interest  rate,  in  which  period  the  resources  are  at the  disposal  of the
creditors  (a  - 1) instead  of being  spent  on consumption  in the  first
period.-60-
APPENDIX  A.4
Differences  of valuation  among  creditors:
some  further  examples
Table  1 through  4  show  how sensitive  Williamson'  example  is to
minor  changes  in  assumptions.  For  convenience,  Table  1 indicates  the
payoffs  for  each  group  of  creditors,  the  probabilities  and  the  expected
(probability  weighted)  payoff  in  case  of the  original  example.  The last
line  indicates  the  sum  of the  expected  payments  in  each  states,  the
resulting  price  and  the  resulting  expected  payoff  to the  creditors  as
the  payments  get  shared.  For  example,  the  optimists  expect  (probability
weighted)  total  payments  of 10 in  the  bad  states,  60 in the  good  states,
indicating  a total  payoff  of 70,  a  price  of 0.7  and  an expected  share  of
repayments  for  them  of 56.  The  country  expects  to repay  66,  the  weighted
average  of the  optimists  and  pessimists  expected  payoffs.
Table  1
Case  1:  Debt  Service  100,  no  buyback
State  of  Available  Country's Optimists'  Pessimists'  Country'
Outcome  FX  Payments  Prob.  Exp.  Prob.  Exp.  Prob.  Exp.
Bad  20  +  10  30  1/3  10  2/3  20  0.4  12
Good  80 +  10  90  2/3  60  1/3  30  0.6  54
56 - 0.7 - 70 10 - 0.5 - 50  0.66 - 66
Table  2 illustrates  the  effect  of the  buyback:  the  pessimists
receive  10 for  sure,  the  optimists  hope for  60,  which  would  make them
better  off,  while  the  country  still  expects  to  pay 66.  There  is "value"
created,  as the  country,  the  optimists  and  the  pessimists  have different
expectations  regarding  the  repayments.
Table  2
Case  2: Debt  Service:  100  - Debt  reduction  through  buyback  (20)  - 80
State  of  Available Country's  Optimists'  Pessimists'  Country'
Outcome  FX  Payments Prob.  Exp.  Prob.  Exp.  Prob.  Exp.
Bad  20  + 10  30  1/3  6 2/3  0.4  12
Good  80 +  10  90  2/3  53  1/3  0.6  54
0.75 - 60  10  66
Table  3 illustrates  the  situation  in  which  the  debt  service  is
below  the  available  foreign  exchange  in  the  good  state  of  nature,  88
below  90._As  a result  the  country  expects  to  pay  only  64.8,  optimist
creditors  expect  the  country  only  to repay  68 2/3  as opposed  to 70,
implying  that  they  themselves  expect  to  receive  only  54.9,  as  opposed  to
56,  on a contractual  debt  service  of  0.8*88  - 70.4,  which  leads  to  a
optimists  price  of 0.78  which  is  higher  than  in  case  1. The  pessimists
expect  payments  of 9.9  and  a price  of  0.56,  on a  contractual  debt
service  of 0.2*88  - 17.6.  The  country  expects  to  pay  64.8.-61-
Table  3
Case  3:  Debt  Service:  88
State  of  Available Country's  Optimists'  Pessimists'  Country'
Outcome  FX  Payments Prob.  Exp.  Prob.  Exp.  Prob.  Exp.
Bad  20 +  10  30  1/3  10  2/3  20  0.4  12
Good  80 + 10  88  2/3  58 2/3  1/3  29 1/3  0.6  52.8
54.9-0.78-68  2/3  9.9-0.56-49  1/3  0.74-64.8
The  pessimists  can  now  be  bought  out  using  the  10 in  foreign
exchange  which  brings  the  debt  service  to  70.4,  the  optimists'  debt
service.  The  optimists  expect  now total  payments  of only  53.6  and  feel
that  they  are  worse  off  than  under  the  no-buyback  scenario.  The
optimists  would  have gotten  to  share  in  the  country's  repayment  in the
good  states  if  the  debt  had  not  been  reduced,  but  now  they  lose  out  as
the  debt is  reduced.  The optimists  will  thus  be inclined  to  block  the
transaction.  The  country  gets  to  keep  90-(10-.8*88)-9.6  in  the  good
states  as  opposed  to only  2  before  the  buyback.  The  country  is  better
off  as it  expects  to repay  less.  The  debt  reduction  allows  the  country
to  reduce  its  payment  in  the  states  of  nature  in  which  it  expected
previously  to lose  (almost)  all its  foreign  exchange.
Table  4
Case  4: Debt  Service:  88 - Debt  Reduction  (10/.56-17.8)  - 70.4
State  of  Available Country's  Optimists'  Pessimists'  Country'
Outcome  FX  Payments Prob.  Exp.  Prob.  Exp.  Prob.  Exp.
Bad  20 - 10  30  1/3  6 2/3  0.4  12
Good  80 +  10  80.4  2/3  46.9  0.6  48.2
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